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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant, Alpine Village Company (hereinafter "Alpine") filed its Complaint on 
December 10,2010. Alpine's subsequently amended Complaint states three causes of action 
stemming from the City's requirement that Alpine comply with the City's inclusionary 
community housing ordinance as a mandatory precondition to Alpine's development of its 
propel1y. Alpine claims that the City's actions effectuated an unlawful taking of Alpine's 
property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
both directly and pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, and a taking or inverse condemnation of 
Alpine's property in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Soon after being served with the Amended Complaint, the City removed the case to 
federal court. The Notice of Removal was followed closely by the City's Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint. Alpine filed a Motion to Remand the action from federal court to state court. That 
Motion was granted by U.S. Chief District Judge B. Lynn Winmill. R., Ex. II (Ex. 29). 
After remand, both Alpine and the City filed Motions for Summary Judgment on all 
issues except the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled. The District Court issued 
its Memorandum Decision on P laintifJ's and Defendant's Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
on December 16,2011. R., Vol. III, p. 519. In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
granted the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Alpine's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The City subsequently moved for an award of attorneys fees. Alpine filed its Notice 
of Appeal from the Memorandum Decision on January 12,2012. R., VoL III, p. 538. The 
District Court denied the City's Motion for Attorneys Fees; and, a Judgment dismissing all 
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claims was entered by the District Court on January 12,2012. R, Vol. III, p. 535. The District 
Court also certified the Judgment as final pursuant to I.RC.P. 54(b). An Amended Notice of 
Appeal was filed by Alpine the same day, simply to confirm that the appeal was being taken 
from the Judgment, as well as the Memorandum Decision. R, Vol. III, p. 542. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented by Alpine in this appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of Law in granting the City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that Alpine's State 
Constitutional Takings/Inverse Condemnation Claim is barred by I.C. §50-219. 
3. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by holding that Alpine's 
Federal Constitutional Takings Claims are unripe. 
4. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law by holding that Alpine's 
Federal Constitutional Takings Claims are barred by I.C. §5-219(4). 
5. Whether Alpine is entitled to an award of attorneys fees on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Alpine Village Planned Unit Development ("Alpine Village") is a mixed use 
residential and commercial condominium project located in downtown McCall. Alpine is the 
developer of Alpine Village. 
The applications required by the McCall City Code for the development of Alpine 
Village were filed with the City of McCall on June 20,2006 (the "Applications"). 
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Approximately four months prior to Alpine's filing of the Applications, and based in large part 
upon the Housing Needs Assessment l , the City had adopted Ordinances 819 and 820, which 
were companion community housing ordinances. R., Ex II (Ex. 1 and 2). Ordinance 819 was an 
"inclusionary housing" ordinance. It required developers of residential subdivisions to provide 
"community housing units" equal in number to a specified percentage of the total units in the 
subdivision.2 These community housing units were required to be deed restricted units available 
for purchase or rent only by income qualified persons. Ordinance 820 required a "Community 
Housing Fee" to be paid at the time of application for a building permit for a residential unit. 
Ordinance 820 is not directly involved in this litigation. 
Ordinance 819 was codified as McCall City Code §9.7.10. R., Ex. II (Ex. 3). It allowed 
an applicant who was subject to the Ordinance to comply in anyone or a combination of the 
following four ways: (i) to build community housing units on the site of the development; (ii) to 
build or provide the community housing units off-site; (iii) to provide land for the construction of 
community housing units; and/or (iv) to pay an "in lieu fee". The Applications were subject to 
the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, as codified in McCall City Code § 9.7.10. 
On September 22, 2006, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors filed a lawsuit against 
the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinances 819 and 820 were unlawful and unconstitutional.3 
In response to the filing, the City declared a moratorium on all new land use applications and 
I The Housing Market and Needs Assessment for Valley and Adams County (Housing Needs Assessment) was 
completed July, 2005, it is attached hereto as Addendum l. 
2 Alpine Village is considered a "subdivision" under the McCall City Code. 
3 Mountain Central Board of Realtors v. City of McCall, Valley County Case No. CV -2006-490C (Idaho, Fourth 
Judicial Dist. Feb. 19,2008). 
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building permits. However, the City continued to require Alpine to comply with Ordinance 819 
as a condition of proceeding with its development applications. The City required a limited 
release of claims to be included in a Development Agreement which was subsequently executed 
by Alpine and the City. The Development Agreement contained a release of claims against the 
City stemming from the outcome of the Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation " ... as to 
Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this [Community Housing] Plan prior to 
the final disposition of such litigation." (emphasis added). R., Ex. II (Ex. 16, p.4 §7.1). No 
release was required by the City, nor granted by Alpine, regarding any other claims. None of the 
condominium units which were acquired and deed restricted by Alpine in compliance with 
Ordinance 819 sold prior to the final disposition of the A10untain Central litigation. 
The McCall Planning and Zoning Commission recommended approval of the 
Applications. In its Findings and Conclusions regarding the Application for Subdivision 
Preliminary Plat Approval, the Commission found that, "[t]he proposed project is subject to the 
requirements of the Inclusionary Housing Ordinance (No. 819)". R., Ex. II (Ex. 7, p.3, Finding 
No. 18 and p. 5, Conclusion No.l2) and concluded that, "[t]he applicant shall obtain approval of 
the community housing plan when the final plat application is presented to the Commission ... ". 
On December 13,2006, the McCall City Council conducted its public hearing on the 
Applications. The City Council granted preliminary approval of the Alpine Village 
Applications. In its Findings and Conclusions regarding the Applications, the Council found 
that,"[t]he proposed project is subject to the requirements of the Inclusionary Housing Ordinance 
(No. 819)" and concluded that,"[t]he applicant shall obtain approval of the community housing 
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plan when the final plat application is presented to the Commission ... " R, Ex. II (Ex. 9, p.3, 
Finding No. 18 and p. 6, Conclusion No. 2.12). 
On January 5, 2007, Alpine entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement by which Alpine 
agreed to purchase a seventeen unit apartment complex in McCall known as the Timbers 
(hereinafter, "Timbers"). The purchase was contingent on Alpine receiving the City'S approval 
of the conversion of the apartments to condominiums and the use of the condominiums as 
community housing units for Alpine Village. R, Ex. II, (Ex. 10 §2). 
On March 12,2007, Alpine submitted a revised Community Housing Plan, which 
proposed to satisfy the requirements of Ordinance 819 for Alpine Village by providing six units 
on site, all seventeen of the Timbers units as off-site units, and the remaining required .5 units by 
paying an "in lieu" fee to the City. R, Ex. II (Ex. 11). 
On March 22, 2007, the McCall City Council granted Preliminary and Final Plat approval 
for the Timbers conversion (i.e. from apartments to condominiums) and for the use of the units 
as community housing units for Alpine Village. R, Ex. II (Ex. 12). The accompanying proposed 
Development Agreement contained language dedicating all seventeen of the Timbers Units as 
community housing units pursuant to McCall City Code §9.7.10. R., E. 11 (Ex. 13, p.2, §4.l). 
On or about April 16,2007, Alpine closed on its purchase of the Timbers project. The 
purchase price paid by Alpine for the property was $2,100,462.40, which was paid in cash at 
closing. R., Ex. II (Ex. 14). Alpine's sole reason for acquiring the Timbers project was to 
provide the Community Housing Units required by Ordinance 819 for Alpine Village. 
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On August 23,2007, the City Council approved the Final PlatIPlan for Phase 1 of Alpine 
Village, which contained the aforesaid revised Community Housing Plan. R., Ex. II, (Ex. 15). 
On December 13,2007, the Development Agreement for Alpine Village was signed. The 
final Community Housing Plan, dedicating all seventeen of the Timbers units as community 
housing units for Alpine Village, was attached as Exhibit B to the Development Agreement.4 
On February 19,2008, District Court Judge Thomas Neville issued a Memorandum 
Decision and Order in Mountain Central, Valley County Case No. CV2006-490-C, finding 
Ordinances 819 and 820 to be unconstitutional, void and invalid. R., Ex. II (Ex. 17). No appeal 
was taken from that Decision. 
On April 24, 2008, the McCall City Council adopted Resolution 08-11, which authorized 
refunds of fees paid pursuant to Ordinance 820 which, as is noted above, was the companion 
Ordinance to Ordinance 819. R., Ex. II (Ex. 18). On June 26, 2008, the City Council adopted 
Resolution 08-175, pursuant to the terms of which refunds were also authorized for those persons 
who "voluntarily" paid Community Housing Fees under Ordinances 827 and 833. R., Ex. II (Ex. 
20, p. 3). 
On August 20, 2008, the First Amendment to the Alpine Village Development was 
recorded. The Amendment released Alpine from any further obligation to provide Community 
Housing for Alpine Village. R., Ex. II (Ex. 21, p. 2§ 1). 
4 R, Ex. II (Ex. 16 §7.1). The Agreement was recorded on January 28, 2008 and was subsequently re-recorded to 
correct typographical errors. 
5 Please note that the title to Resolution 08-17 provided for refund of community housing fees collected under 
Ordinance 820, 828 and 833; however, the body of the resolution provides for refunds offees pursuant to 820, 827 
and 833. 
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On November 4,2009, the McCall City Council adopted Resolution 09-106, which 
established December 31, 2009 as the last date on which requests for refunds of Community 
Housing Fees paid pursuant to Ordinances 820, 827, or 833 could be submitted. R., Ex. II (Ex. 
22). Fifty-eight refund requests, totaling $92,820, were received, approved and paid by the City 
for Community Housing Fees paid pursuant to Ordinances 820,827 or 833. R., Vol. III, p. 403. 
Everyone of the refund requests which was paid by the City was filed long after the expiration of 
the 180-day period within which such requests arguably would have been required to be filed 
under I.C. §50-219. In fact, the City accepted and paid refund requests which were submitted as 
long as forty-three months after the fees had been paid. The City did not assert I.C. §50-219 as a 
bar or defense to any of these refund requests. 
No procedure or authorization whatsoever was provided by the City for the filing of 
refund requests or claims for the recovery of fees paid or monies expended pursuant to 
Ordinance 819. 7 
ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction 
In order for Alpine to proceed with its development plan for Alpine Village, it was 
required to comply with the mandatory provisions of the City's Ordinance 819. Alpine was not 
allowed to conclude the permitting process with the City until it had proposed a Community 
6 Please note that the title to Resolution 09-10 provided for refund of community housing fees collected under 
Ordinance 820, 828 and 833; however, the body of the resolution provides for refunds of fees pursuant to 820,827 
and 833. 
7 The chronology of events which is contained in the Statement of Facts is illustrated in a condensed Timeline, 
which is attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
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Housing Plan which was determined by the McCall City Council to be compliant with Ordinance 
819. Alpine complied with the Ordinance by acquiring the Timbers, by then converting the 
Timbers to saleable condominium units, and lastly by dedicating the units solely as community 
housing units. Alpine acquired the Timbers for one and only one reason, namely to comply with 
Ordinance 819 and move forward with the Alpine Village project. 
After the Mountain Central Board of Realtors initiated a lawsuit against the City which 
facially challenged Ordinance 819 and its companion Ordinance 820, with full knowledge that its 
Ordinance was being challenged, the City continued to impose Ordinance 819 on Alpine as a 
mandatory precondition of Alpine's development of Alpine Village. In addition, the City 
exacted from Alpine a limited release of claims which might arise from the resolution of the 
Mountain Central litigation. Thus, with full knowledge that its Ordinance was being challenged 
as unconstitutional and unlawful, and with only this limited release, the City continued to require 
Alpine to comply with the Ordinance by acquiring, converting and restricting the Timbers units. 
Ordinance 819 was subsequently found to be unlawful and unconstitutional in the final 
decision which was rendered in the Mountain Central litigation. By the time the City thereafter 
released the Timbers units from their community housing restrictions and thereby freed Alpine to 
sell or rent the Timbers units without restrictions, the value of the units had severely declined 
and Alpine was left with no means to recover its resultant losses. This is the core of Alpine's 
takings claims which have been asserted in this litigation. 
The District Court did not address the merits of Alpine's claims. Instead, the Court found 
the claims to be time barred or unripe. However, the cross motions for summary judgment 
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which were presented to the District Court were not limited to the timeliness or ripeness of the 
claims. Alpine also argued in its Motion that the merits of Alpine's claims could be resolved as 
a matter oflaw. In response, the City did not dispute that, if Alpine's claims were found to be 
timely, a compensable taking had in fact occurred. It is, thus, Alpine's position in this appeal not 
only that the District COUli's holdings should be reversed, but, additionally, that this Court can 
and should hold that summary judgment should be granted in favor of Alpine on the merits of 
Alpine's claims, as requested by Alpine in its Motion for Summary Judgment. This would leave 
for trial only the issue of the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled. 
II. Standard of Review 
This Court applies the same standard in reviewing the appeal of an order granting 
summary judgment as the District Court used when originally ruling on the motion. This Court 
exercises free review over the record and over issues of statutory construction. Huskinson v. 
Nelson, 152 Idaho 547, 272 P.3d 519 (2012); Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012). 
Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009); VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 
Idaho 326, 331, 109 P.3d 714, 719 (2005). 
III. The City's Imposition of Ordinance 819 on Alpine constituted a Taking or an 
Inverse Condemnation under Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution; and, if 
compensation is denied under Alpine's State Constitutional Claim, then a compensable 
taking has occurred under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
A. The issue of whether a taking has occurred is an issue of law. 
The issue of whether a taking has occurred, as opposed to the amount of compensation 
which is owed, is a legal issue to be resolved by the Court. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 
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667,670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,596 P.2d 75 (1979). 
See also, Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780,53 P.3d 828,831 (2002). 
This case presents a unique set of facts, not often found in inverse condemnation or 
takings actions. McCall City Ordinance 819, which is the basis of Alpine's takings claims, has 
already been held by the Court in Mountain Central to be void, unlawful and unconstitutional. 
Thus, unlike most of the takings cases which will be cited to the Court, the issue of whether the 
City's underlying ordinance was constitutional or whether the City had any authority at all to 
require Alpine to expend funds or divest itself of property rights in compliance with the 
Ordinance has already been fully, finally and adversely resolved against the City. 
B. The application of Ordinance 819 to Alpine effectuated a per se taking of Alpine's 
protected property interests. 
Both the Idaho and United States Constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation.s "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation was designed to bar Govermnent 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49,80 S.Ct. 1563, 
1569,4 L.Ed.2d 1554, (1960). 
In Lingle v. Chevron US.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2076, 161 L. Ed. 
2d 876 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Comi identified the two types of regulatory actions 
which will be deemed to be per se takings under the Fifth Amendment: 
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Regulatory actions generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment 
purposes (1) where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical 
invasion of its property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 
U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868, or (2) where regulations completely 
deprive an owner of "all economically beneficial us[ e]" of her property, Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 
L.Ed.2d 798.9 
Ordinance 819 effectuated a Loretto type of per se physical taking of two constitutionally 
protected property interests, Alpine's money and Alpine's right to freely exclude people from 
and dispose of its property. Either way, the application of the Ordinance to Alpine was a per se 
violation of the aforesaid Idaho and United States Constitutional provisions for which 
compensation must be paid. 
1. The City took a fundamental and constitutionally protected property right from 
Alpine, namely the right to freely exclude people from and dispose of its property. 
One of the bundle of fundamental, constitutionally protected property rights which has 
been recognized by the courts is the right of an owner to freely exclude people from and dispose 
of propeliy. This Court has recognized that, "Property in a thing consists not merely in its 
ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and disposal. 
Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent destroys the property 
itself." O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42, 202 P.2d 401,404 (1949) (emphasis 
added). This view is not unique to Idaho. The United States Supreme Court has long held that 
property consists of a "[G]roup of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as 
8 "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Fifth Amendment to U. S. 
Const. "Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the 
manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14. 
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the right to possess, use and dispose of it." Us. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 US. 373, 378, 65 S. 
Ct. 357,359,891. Ed. 311 (1945). See also Kaiser Aetna v. Us., 444 US. 164, 179, 100 S. Ct. 
383,393,621. Ed. 2d 332 (1979), "[W]e hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to 
be a fundamental element of the propeliy right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation." 
The City required Alpine to permanently deed restrict its community housing units as to 
both purchase price and eligible purchasers. Alpine was required to place restrictions on its 
property which allowed Alpine to sell or lease its property only at restricted prices and only to 
those individuals who met certain age, income and residency requirements, as established and 
administered by the City of McCall. R., Ex. II (Ex. 1, p. 9, ,-[7). In short, the City took from 
Alpine its fundamental right to dispose of its property to whomever it chose and for whatever 
price it could obtain. The City also took from Alpine its right to freely exclude others from the 
property and to determine who will occupy the property. 
A per se Loretto taking does not require an actual physical invasion of one's property by 
the government. The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that where the character of the 
governmental action implicates fundamental property rights a per se taking could be found, even 
absent a literal physical invasion of the property by the governmental entity itself. Hodel v. 
Irving, 481 US. 704, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 95 1. Ed. 2d 668 (1987). 
9 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court held that a compensable taking resulted 
from the government's appropriation of part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apmtment tenants. 
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This same per se takings analysis has been applied by various state courts in cases in 
which the court found that an essential property right had been infringed. In Gregory v. City of 
San Juan Capistrano, 142 Cal. App. 3d 72,191 Cal. Rptr. 47, (Ct. App. 1983) the California 
Court of Appeals found that a city ordinance which required an owner who desired to sell his 
mobile home park first to offer it to "the residents," violated the park owner's right to control the 
disposition of his or her property. 
The ability to sell and transfer property is a fundamental aspect of property 
ownership. Property consists mainly of three powers: possession, use, and 
disposition. (US. v. General Motors Corp., supra., 323 U.S. at pp. 377-378 [89 
L.Ed. at p. 318].) California courts have long recognized the fundamental 
importance of an owner's right, absent an illegal purpose, to sell property to 
whomever the owner chooses. "The constitutional guaranty securing to every 
person the right of 'acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,' ... includes the 
right to dispose of such property in such innocent manner as he please." (Ex Parte 
Quarg (1906) 149 Cal. 79, 80 [84 P. 766]; see Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial 
Home (1914) 167 Cal. 570,575 [140 P. 242; Laguna Royale Owners Assn. v. 
Darger (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 670, 681 [174 Cal.Rptr. 136.) This part of the 
ordinance simply appropriates an owner's right to sell his property to persons of 
his choice. City has thus "extinguish[ed] a fundamental attribute of ownership," in 
violation of federal and state constitutions. (See Agins v. Tiburon, supra., 447 
U.S. at p. 262 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 113].) 
Gregory v. San Juan, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 58. 
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the forced transfer ofa right of first refusal 
constituted a taking. "The instant case falls within the rule that would generally find a taking 
where a regulation deprives the owner of a fundamental attribute of property ownership. See 
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Guimont, 121 Wash.2d at 605 n. 7, 854 P.2d 1; Settle, supra, at 387" Manufactured Housing 
Communities of Washington v. State, 142 Wash. 2d 347,369, 13 P.3d 183, 194 (2000).10 
Ordinance 819, as applied to Alpine by the City, was an outright invasion of Alpine's 
right to freely dispose of its property, through sale or rent, to a buyer or lessee of its choosing, at 
a price of its choosing. The determination of price and person was controlled by the City, not 
Alpine. The Ordinance resulted in the forced occupation of Alpine's property by renters or 
buyers approved by the City, not Alpine. As such, under the authority cited above, a per se 
taking occurred. This conclusion follows directly from the findings of Judge Neville in 
Mountain Central. 
The restrictions for community housing dictate the price for which the property 
may be sold and to whom the property may be sold. Even if the landowner builds 
rental units, the restrictions that twenty percent ofthe units be community housing 
also limit how much rent a landowner may charge and to whom the units may be 
rented. These restrictions go much further than merely regulating the use of 
property; instead, they essentially regulate ownership of the property by dictating 
to whom a unit may be sold or rented. 
R., Ex. II (Ex. 17, p.29 L.20) 
2. The requirement that Alpine expend money to comply with a void and 
unconstitutional ordinance effectuated a taking. 
Under the perceived authority of Ordinance 819, the City required Alpine to spend in 
excess oftwo million dollars to provide low income housing for a public use. With the holding 
in Mountain Central, it is undisputed that the City had no statutory authority to require Alpine to 
10 See also Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 84 N.Y.2d 385, 398, 643 N.E.2d 479 (1994), holding "Property 
attributes to any physical object include the rights 'to possess, use and dispose' of the asset (United States v General 
Motors Corp., 323 US 373, 378). It is well established that even if only a single element of an owner's 'bundle of 
[property] rights' is extinguished, there has been a regulatory taking." 
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spend any money whatsoever for this purpose. Money is property in the constitutional sense. 
"Money is clearly property that may not be taken for public use without the payment of just 
compensation. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 
(2003)." BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004). 
In BHA this Court found that the payment of money to the City of Boise pursuant to a 
city ordinance that the Court had earlier ruled void was an unconstitutional taking. "Since the 
City had no authority to charge the liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of the fee constituted a 
taking of property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions." BHA Investments, Inc, 141 
Idaho at 172, 108 P.3d at 319. There is no constitutionally relevant distinction between BHA's 
payment of money directly to the City of Boise and Alpine's payment of money to a third patty 
to purchase propeliy as required by the Ordinance. It is the taking of property for a public use 
without compensation that constitutes the taking. In both instances, the exactions were mandated 
by an ordinance later declared to be invalid. Thus under BHA, Loretto and Brown, the 
requirement that Alpine expend money to provide community housing was a compensable per se 
physical taking under both Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
C. The fact that Alpine retains ownership of the Timbers and that the community 
housing restrictions were eventually released by the City is irrelevant to whether a 
taking has occurred. 
State and Federal case law leave no doubt that a temporary taking, such as the one before 
this Court, is nonetheless a compensable taking. "If a regulation of private property that amounts 
to a taking is later invalidated, this action convelts the taking to a "temporary" one for which the 
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government must pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land during that period." 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 2l3, 216, 912 P.2d 100, 103 (1996) citing First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County., 482 U.S. 304, 319,107 S.Ct. 
2378,2388,96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). The fact that Alpine owns the Timbers will certainly be 
relevant to the issue of the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled. It has no bearing 
on the issue which is before this Court, namely whether a compensable taking has occurred. 
IV. The District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that Alpine's State Inverse 
Condemnation/Takings Claim is barred by I.C. §50-219. 
A. Introduction 
Alpine has acknowledged throughout this case that I.C. §50-219 applies the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act Notice of Claim Statute (i.e., I.C. §6-906) to non-tOli claims for damages asserted 
against municipalities. Alpine has also consistently conceded that it did not timely file a notice of 
claim with City, as required by I.C. §50-219. However, Alpine's failure to file a notice of claim 
should be excused because the application by the City to Alpine of the Notice of Claim Statute 
constitutes an unconstitutional denial of Alpine's right to equal protection of the law, and 
because the City should be estopped from asserting the Statute as a bar to Alpine's state claim. 
The District Court found that Alpine's failure to comply with the Statute is a jurisdictional bar to 
Alpine's pursuit of its state claim. The District Court therefore declined to consider Alpine's 
arguments that it would be unconstitutional and inequitable to apply the Statute to Alpine. 
The District Court erred as a matter of law in reaching this conclusion, for two reasons. 
First, even if I.C. §6-908 is found to be applicable to Alpine's claim, the District Court erred in 
holding that I.C. §6-908 is ajurisdictional bar which precludes consideration of Alpine's 
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constitutional and equitable defenses. Second, the District Court erred in holding that I.e. §50-
219 applies not just I.C. §6-906 but also I.e. §6-908 to non-tOli claims for damages against 
municipalities. 
B. The District Court erred in holding that I.e. §6-908 is a jurisdictional bar which 
precludes consideration of Alpine's Constitutional and Equitable Defenses to the 
application of I.e. §50-219 to Alpine's State Constitutional Claim. 
Although Alpine contends that the District Court erred as a matter of law in holding that 
I.e. §50-219 results in the application ofI.C. §6-908 to Alpine's State Constitutional Claim (see 
discussion below), this error becomes moot if this Court concurs with Alpine's position that the 
requirements of I.e. §6-908 are not 'jurisdictional". The District Court's holding that non-
compliance with I.C. §6-908 is a jurisdictional bar which precludes consideration of Alpine's 
compelling constitutional and equitable arguments should be reversed because it is 
fundamentally inconsistent with well settled principles of statutory construction. 
While the Court of Appeals has held in Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 116 
Idaho 758, 779 P.2d 433, (Ct. App. 1989), that failure to comply with the notice of claim 
requirements of the ITCA deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court has never 
directly considered the issue. The undisputed facts of this case provide a compelling reason for 
this Court to do so now. I.C. §6-908, the statute at issue, reads as follows: "No claim or action 
shall be allowed against a govermnental entity or its employee unless the claim has been 
presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." It was not until the Court of 
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Appeals decision in Madsen that the characterization ofLC. §6-908 as jurisdictional first 
appeared. 11 
The Madsen Court's conclusion that noncompliance with the notice requirements of the 
ITCA divests the courts of subject matter jurisdiction was made without any analysis or citation 
to Supreme Court precedent. While prior decisions of this Court have held compliance with the 
notice requirements of the ITCA to be a "condition precedent" and "mandatory precondition", 
none have ever gone so far as to declare that the statute creates a jurisdictional bar. There are 
compelling reasons to reject the Madsen Court's conclusion. 
The district court is a court of general jurisdiction. The Idaho Constitution provides that 
"The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity ... " 
Idaho Const. Art. 5, §20. This Court held in Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77,80,218 P.3d 
1138, 1141 (2009), "This Court has adopted a presumption that courts of general jurisdiction 
have subject matter jurisdiction unless a party can show otherwise". Citing Borah v. 
McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 78,205 P.3d 1209, 1214 .. 
In addition to a presumption of jurisdiction, the Borah court cited with approval language 
from the Vermont Supreme court in Lamell Lumber Corp. v. Newstress Intern., Inc., 182 Vt. 
282,938 A.2d 1215 (2007), which required that the presumption of a courts' jurisdiction could 
be overcome only by a showing of a "clear" legislative intent. "However, the superior court is 
presumed to retain jurisdiction over all civil actions unless the Legislature has clearly indicated 
11 Alpine is unable to find any subsequent Idaho cases where Madsen is cited or where I.e. §6-908 is held to be 
jurisdictional. 
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to the contrary. Contrary to defendant's assertion, we find nothing ... that suggests a legislative 
intent-implied or otherwise-to "oust" the superior court of general jurisdiction ... " See Borah, 
147 Idaho at 78, 205 P.3d at 1214 (2009). 
This holding in Borah is consistent with the position taken in other jurisdictions. In 
Labelle v. McKay Dee Hasp. etr., 2004 UT 15, 89 P.3d 113, 144 (2004) at n.2, the Utah 
Supreme Court held: "We presume that our district courts retain their grant of constitutional 
jurisdiction in the absence of a clearly expressed statutory intention to limit jurisdiction." The 
Labelle Court cited consistent holdings by the Supreme Courts of Arizona, Hawaii and 
Michigan. 12 
The language of the I.C. §6-908 simply does not meet this test. It does not rise to the 
required level of stating a clear and unambiguous legislative intent to divest the district court of 
jurisdiction. Had the Idaho Legislature intended the requirements ofI.C. §6-908 to be 
jurisdictional it could and should have clearly so stated, as did this Court in I.R.C.P. 84(n), which 
provides: 
(n) Effect of Failure to Comply With Time Limits. The failure to physically file a 
petition for judicial review or cross-petition for judicial review with the district 
court within the time limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be 
jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial 
review upon motion of any party, or upon initiative of the district court. Failure of 
a party to timely take any other step in the process for judicial review shall not be 
deemed jurisdictional, but may be grounds only for such other action or sanction 
12 See also, Vi!!. o/Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 193,366 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1985), 
"The normal construction of jurisdictional rules includes a presumption that once jurisdiction attaches, it cannot be 
ousted or lost absent a clear indication of such a purpose." 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 19 
as the district cOUli deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the 
petition for review. 
Notice of claim statutes which are comparable to I.C. §6-908 have been held to be 
procedural in many other jurisdictions. In Millman v. County of Butler, 235 Neb. 915, 929, 458 
N.W.2d 207, 216, (1990) the court held; 
Thus far, we have determined that compliance with the notice requirement of the 
Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for a 
negligence action brought under the act and have also reaffirmed the principle that 
filing or presenting a claim against a political subdivision is a condition precedent 
for a claimant's right to commence a tort action against a political subdivision. As 
we noted in Schmid v. Malcolm Sch. Dist., 233 Neb. 580,447 N.W.2d 20 (1989), 
filing or presenting a tort claim against a political subdivision is a procedural 
matter under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims ACt.13 
In Pritchard v. State, 163 Ariz. 427, 430, 788 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1990), the Arizona 
Supreme Court also held that non-compliance with its equivalent notice of claim statute was a 
non-jurisdictional requirement to which defenses could be asserted: 
After examining the language of § 12-821, the legislative policy underlying the 
statute, and prior precedent on the matter, we conclude that filing a claim with the 
state pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821 goes to the plaintiff's right to recover rather 
than to the power of the court to grant relief. We hold that filing a timely claim is 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit, but is a requirement more 
analogous to a statute of limitations. Because compliance with § 12-821 is not 
jurisdictional, issues of excusable neglect or incompetence under the statute are to 
be resolved like any other disputed issue of fact in the case. 
13 Supporting decisions from other jurisdictions which were cited by the Millman Court include Pritchard v. State, 
supra; Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661 (R.I.l986); Vasys v. Metropolitan District Commission, 387 
Mass. 51, 438 N.E.2d 836 (1982); Hillv. Middletown Bd of Ed , supra; City of Wilmington v. Spencer, 391 A.2d 
199 (DeI.1978); Thompson v. City of Aurora, 263 Ind. 187,325 N.E.2d 839 (1975); Yurechko v. Allegheny Co., 430 
Pa. 325,243 A.2d 372 (1968); Kamani v. Port of Houston Authority, supra; Bryant v. Duval County Hosp. 
Authority, 502 So.2d 459 (Fla.App.1986). 
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In holding the Arizona statute to be procedural, the Pritchard court cited similar holdings 
by other jurisdictions, including California, Florida and the District of Columbia, confirming that 
equitable defenses could be asserted to comparable notice of claim statutes. Jd. I4 
Recognizing the notice requirements of the ITCA to be procedural does not compromise 
the basic purpose of the Act. IS It leaves intact all of the notice components of the Act and the 
consequences of an unexcused failure to comply with those notice requirements. It would 
however, allow a court to at least consider and address a litigant's claim that it should be excused 
from compliance with the notice requirements on constitutional or equitable grounds. And, in 
those limited instances where such defenses are deemed compelling, it would allow litigants 
access to the courts. Until Alpine's constitutional and equitable defenses to the application of 
I.C. §50-219 have been considered on their merits, Alpine's State Constitutional Taking/Inverse 
Condemnation Claim cannot be deemed to have been resolved on its merits. Because Alpine's 
constitutional and equitable defenses are based on undisputed facts, this COUli can and should 
determine the ultimate merit of those defenses. 
14 The Pritchard court continued at fn4: "Several other jurisdictions have coneluded that their claim statutes are not 
jurisdictional and, like a statute of limitations, are subject to waiver or cstoppel. See Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood, 6 Ca1.3d 
353, 99 Cal.Rptr. 13,491 P.2d 805 (1971); Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1965); Bryant v. Duval 
Hosp. Authority, 502 So.2d 459 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986); Gordy Construction Co. v. KHM Development Co., 128 Ga.App. 648, 
197 S.E.2d 426 (1973); Dunbar v. Rdser, 26 IlI.App.3d 708, 325 N.E.2d 440 (1975) aff'd, 64 Ill.2d 230,1 IlLDec. 89, 356 
N.E.2d 89 (1976); LaBriola v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 227 Pa.Super. 305, 323 A.2d 9 (1974); Hill v. 
Board of Ed. of Middletown, 183 N.J.Super. 36, 443 A.2d 225 (1982)." 
15 This court has held in Cobbley v. City a/Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 157,59 P.3d 959, 962 (2002), "The purpose of 
I.e. §6-906 is to" '(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of 
the differences between parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in 
order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state to prepare defenses.' " Friel v. 
Boise City Housing Auth., 126 Idaho 484,486,887 P.2d 29,31 (1994) (quoting Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 
426-27,816 P.2d 982,983-84 (1991))". 
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c. I.C. §50-219 does not apply I.e. §6-908 to non-tort claims for damages against 
municipalities. 
The District Court held that the language of I.C. §50-219 incorporates not only I.C. §6-
906 (the requirement that a claim must be filed against a city within 180 days of its accrual) but 
also I.C. §6-908 (a prohibition of filing an action against a city unless a claim was timely 
presented and filed with the city) to non-tort claims for damages against municipalities. This 
formed the foundation for the District Court's holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
and that, therefore, it could not entertain any defenses to a failure to comply with the notice 
requirements ofI.C. §6-906. R., Vol. III, p. 525-527. As is noted above, if this Court concurs 
with Alpine's argument that I.C. §6-908 is a procedural, not jurisdictional, statute, then the 
District Court's holding that I.C. §50-219 incorporates not only I.C. §6-906 but also I.C. §6-908, 
while erroneous, does not prevent Alpine from asserting its claim that it should be excused from 
compliance with the notice of claim requirements on constitutional and equitable grounds. 
Nonetheless, Alpine contends that both rulings were legally erroneous. 
I.C. §50-219 is a short and simple statute. It states; "All claims for damages against a 
city must be filed as prescribed by chapter 9 title 6, Idaho Code." Alpine's position is that I.e. 
§50-219 incorporates only the claim filing procedures of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (i.e. I.C. §6-
906). The language ofI.C. §50-219 requires that all claims for damages against a city must be 
filed as prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code. There are twenty-nine statutory sections in 
chapter 9, title 6. Only two sections prescribe when and how claims must be filed. These are 
I.C. §6-906- Time for filing claims and I.C. §6-907- Contents of claim. 
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In Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 798 P.2d 27 (1990), this Court had the opportunity to 
apply the rules of statutory construction to the meaning of the words all claims must be filed as 
prescribed in I.C. §50-219. Sweitzer argued that I.C. §50-219, as amended in 1983, acted to 
incorporated the entire ITCA. In rejecting that argument and limiting the scope ofI.C. §50-219 
to I.C. § 6-906 the Court held: 
Applying the plain meaning of the words "all" and "filed" in conjunction with 
that of the word "prescribe," may clearly be construed to mean that all damage 
claims are to be filed as directed by or in the manner set forth in the ITCA. 
Applying the plain meaning of the language contained in I.C. §50-219 clearly 
demonstrates that the legislature's intent was to incorporate the notice 
requirements contained in chapter 9, title 6 so as to make the filing procedures for 
all claims against a municipality uniform, standard and consistent. To construe the 
language to mean that the Tort Claims Act is substituted for I.C. § 50-219 would 
render I.C. § 50-219 meaningless and essentially null. We therefore construe the 
language contained in I. C. § 50-219 to require that a claimant must file a notice of 
claim for all damage claims, tort or otherwise, as directed by the filing procedure 
set forth in I.C. § 6-906 of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, chap. 9, tit. 6. 
Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho at 572, 798 P .2d at 31. 
The District Cowi expressed concern that to hold that I.C. §50-219 only encompasses 
I.C. §6-906 and not I.C. §6-908 would create numerous case by case exceptions for untimely 
notices. R., Vol. III, p. 526. This concern of course assumed that I.C. §6-908 is a jurisdictional 
statute. In any event, while the statutory construction advanced by Alpine may produce 
exceptions to the application of the Notice of Claims Statute as a bar in select cases, those 
exceptions would have to be based on the existence of factually and legally meritorious claims. 
Moreover, as this Court held in Verska v. St' Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 
889,265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011), "We must follow the law as written. If it is socially or 
economically unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial." 
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It is, thus, Alpine's position that Le. §50-219 incorporates only I.C. §§6-906 and 907 and 
not I.C. §6-908. There is clearly no evidence in I.C. §50-219 or I.C. §§6-906 and 907 ofa 
legislative intent to limit the courts' jurisdiction. Even if this Court were to hold that I.C. §50-
219 does incorporate LC. §6-908, this Court should hold that I.C. §6-908 is not jurisdictional. In 
either case, Alpine's claims that it should be excused from compliance with the notice 
requirements on constitutional and equitable grounds should have been considered by the District 
Court and should be considered by this Court. In the event that this Court finds that Alpine's 
equitable and constitutional defenses are well founded, then this Court is free to consider 
Alpine's State Takings/Inverse Condemnation Claim on its merits. In the event that this Court 
finds that Alpine's equitable and constitutional defenses are not persuasive and dismisses 
Alpine's state claim, this Court should then proceed to consider Alpine's federal claim. This is 
the procedure prescribed by San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, et al., 
545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 162 L. Ed. 2d 315 (2005) and followed by the this COUli in BHA 
Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, supra. 
D. Application of the ISO-Day Notice of Claim Statute to Alpine's State Inverse 
Condemnation Claim would violate Alpine's Constitutional Right to Equal 
Protection. 
After Ordinances 819 and 820 were declared unconstitutional in the Mountain Central 
decision, the McCall City Council on April 24,2008 adopted Resolution 08-11, which 
authorized refunds of fees paid pursuant to Ordinance 820. Shortly thereafter, the City Council 
adopted Resolution 08-17, pursuant to the terms of which, refunds were also authorized for those 
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persons who "voluntarily" paid Community Housing Fees under Ordinances 827 and 833. The 
City accepted such refund requests through December 31,2009. 
A total of $92,820 in refunds was paid to fifty-eight claimants. Everyone ofthe refund 
requests which was paid by the City was filed long after the expiration of the 180-day period 
within which such requests arguably would have been required to be filed under I.C. §50-219. In 
fact, the City accepted and paid refund requests which were submitted as long asforty-three 
months after the fees had been paid. 16 The City did not assert I.C. §50-219 as a bar or defense to 
any of these refund requests. Under the very arguments made by the City in this case, the Notice 
of Claim Statute would have barred the refund claims asserted by each and everyone of those 
persons who requested refunds. Yet, the City elected to waive compliance with the statute for all 
of the refund claimants. 
Ordinance 819 and 820 were treated in all respects by the City as companion ordinances 
and both required the expenditure of money to support community housing, as did the voluntary 
provisions of Ordinances 827 and 833. Those complying with Ordinance 820 paid monies 
directly to the City. Those voluntarily proposing community housing plans pursuant to 
Ordinances 827 and 833 could have expended monies either in direct payment to the City or to 
third parties. Similarly, those subject to the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, like 
Alpine, could have expended monies either to construct community housing units, to purchase 
community housing units, to purchase land for community housing units andlor by direct 
payment to the City of "in lieu fees". In his Memorandum Decision and Order in Mountain 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 25 
Central Board o/Realtors v. City o/McCall, Judge Neville treated Ordinances 819 and 820 
jointly and as legally indistinguishable. 
It follows from these undisputed facts that those who were required to expend monies 
pursuant to Ordinance 819 were in the same class, for equal protection purposes, as those who 
paid fees pursuant to Ordinances 820, 827 and 833. By excusing those who paid mandatory fees 
pursuant to Ordinance 820 or who voluntarily expended monies pursuant to Ordinances 827 or 
833 from compliance with the Notice of Claim Statute, while now asseliing the Statute as a bar 
to Alpine's claim for compensation, the City has violated Alpine's right to equal protection of 
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Idaho Constitution. 
There is very little distinction between the treatment of Alpine's equal protection claim 
under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 569, 38 P.3d 
598,607 (2001) this Court explained that an equal protection analysis under both the federal and 
Idaho Constitutions generally involves a three-step process. 
The first step is to identify the classification that is being challenged. The second 
step is to determine the standard under which the classification will be judicially 
reviewed. The final step is to determine whether the appropriate standard has 
been satisfied. (Citations omitted). 
The classification at issue in this case is that Alpine is the only one of at least fifty-nine 
similarly situated persons (i.e. persons subjected to the City's Community Housing Ordinances 
whose claims accrued more than 180 days prior to filing notices with the City) against whom the 
City is asserting I.e. §50-219 as a bar. While the standard of judicial review of the classification 
16 Alpine's lawsuit was filed less than 35 months after it signed the Development Agreement. 
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differs somewhat for a state versus a federal equal protection claim, under either the "rational 
basis" test appears to be the appropriate level of scrutiny of the City's actions. 17 The 
determinative inquiry thus becomes whether the City's conduct survives the rational basis test. 
The rational basis test requires that a statutory classification be rationally related to a 
legitimate government objective. 18 In Bon Appetit Gormet Foods, Inc. v. State Dept. of 
Employment, 117 Idaho 1002, 793 P.2d 675 (1990), the Court utilized a two-step analysis in 
applying the rational basis test. That analysis first requires a determination of whether the statute 
(in this case the City's refund Resolutions) reflects any reasonably conceivable public purpose, 
and, second, a determination of whether the classification is reasonably related to that purpose. 
In its briefing and argument to the District Court, the only public purpose which was 
offered by the City for its refund Resolutions and conduct was fundamental fairness (i.e. it was 
"the right thing to do"). In the City's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Response Briefin Opposition to Alpine's Motionfor Summary Judgment the City stated: 
[T]he City went the extra mile in allowing refunds of fees paid to it by various 
other developers after the housing ordinances were declared unconstitutional. The 
City did not have to do so, because many of those claims were also barred by the 
statute of limitations or the 180 day rule. However, given the Court's ruling in 
Mountain Central Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall, Case No. CV 2006-490-
C (Idaho Fourth Judicial District, February 19, 2008), the City detennined that 
returning money received under the housing ordinances was the right thing to do. 
R., Vol. III, p. 436. 
17 See Meisner v. Potlatch COlp., 131 Idaho 258, 954 P.2d 676 (1998), regarding economic and social welfare 
legislation, and Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Employment, 117 Idaho lO02, 793 P.2d 675 
(1990), regarding taxation legislation. 
18 Rudeen, l36 at 569, 38 P.2d at 607. 
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The singular justification which was offered below by the City for the differential 
treatment afforded to every other member of the class of persons who were subj ected to 
community housing extractions is that Alpine did not pay fees or contribute property to the City 
and that Alpine got the equivalent of a full 'refund' by the City's release of the community 
housing restrictions on the Timbers property. R., Vol. II, p. 316. As is argued above, it is not 
only disingenuous but legally indefensible to suggest that, having required Alpine to expend over 
two million dollars to acquire the Timbers and having then imposed significant restrictions on 
Alpine's ownership rights in the Timbers, merely releasing the restrictions a year later is the 
equivalent of a 'full refund' or, more impOliantly, eliminates the City's liability for the taking. 
The record herein establishes and the City itself conceded below that the City could have 
asserted LC. §50-219 as a bar to everyone of the refund applications which the City invited and 
paid. Its assertion in this action ofLC. §50-219 appears to be driven by the potential size of 
Alpine's claim, not by any genuine or rational basis for distinguishing Alpine from the other 
members of the class. The City should be constitutionally barred from asserting the Notice of 
Claim statute solely against Alpine. 
E. The City should be estopped from asserting the 1S0-day Notice of Claim Statute as a 
bar to Alpine's State Claim 
"The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party 
to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior position". Willig v. State Dept. of Health & 
Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). The identical set of facts which form 
the basis for the equal protection defense discussed above support the claim that the City should 
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be estopped from asserting that Alpine is required to comply with the Notice of Claim Statute. 
After excusing some fifty-eight other similarly situated claimants from having to comply with 
the Notice of Claims Statute, the City now argues that the Notice of Claim Statute bars Alpine's 
state takings claim. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the position which was, without 
exception, taken by the City over a nearly two year period between April, 2008 and December 
31, 2009. The advantage being gained by the City and disadvantage resulting to Alpine from this 
fundamental change of position is that Alpine's claim is potentially baned despite being filed 
within the same period of time after its accrual as was allowed for all other similarly situated 
claimants. The District Court found that Alpine's state claim accrued not later than December 
13,2007. Alpine made demand on the City for compensation on November 15,2010, or 
approximately thirty-five months after the date of accrual, as found by the District Court. The 
City now asserts that the claim is time baned by I.e. §50-219. In contrast, the City accepted and 
paid requests for refunds on monies paid pursuant to Ordinance 820 which were submitted as 
long as forty-three months after the accrual date of such claims. The City should be estopped 
from asselting this dramatic change of position. 
v. Alpine's State Constitution Claim was filed well within the four years prescribed by 
I.C. §5-224. 
There is no dispute that Alpine's state inverse condemnation claim is subject to Idaho's 
residual four-year statute of limitations, I.C. §5-224. The only potential issue is when the four-
year statute of limitations began to run. Idaho law has recognized that an inverse condemnation 
cause of action accrues "after the full extent of the impainnent of the plaintiffs' use and 
enjoyment of [the property] becomes apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint; 100 Idaho 667, 671, 
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603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (quoting Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798,802, 160 Ct.Cl. 295 
(1963) The Tibbs Court reasoned that "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible 
to exact determination, is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impairment, of such a 
degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, 
became apparent." Id. 
The Tibbs standard was reiterated by this Court in McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 
128 Idaho 213, 217,912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996) and more recently in City of Coeur d'Alene v. 
Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310, 317 (2006). In Simpson, the Supreme Court held 
that the landowner's inverse condemnation and takings cause of action accrued not when the 
subject Shoreline Regulations were adopted, but when those Regulations were actually applied to 
Simpson's property. In support of its holding that the landowner's cause of action did not accrue 
until the Shoreline Regulations were actually applied adversely to his property, the Simpson 
Court quoted Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001): 
In Palazzolo, the United States Supreme Court held that a regulatory takings 
claim does not become ripe upon enactment of the regulation; indeed, it remains 
unripe until the landowner takes the reasonable and necessary steps to allow the 
regulating agency to consider development plans and issue a decision, thereby 
determining the extent to which the regulation actually burdens the property. 
Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 P.3d at 317. 
The District Court held that Alpine's state constitutional cause of action accrued "no later 
than" December 13,2007. R., Vol. III, p. 528. Alpine does not take issue with that holding, 
except for its implication that Alpine's cause of action might have accrued before December 13, 
2007. Consistent with this Court's holding in Simpson, Alpine has consistently argued that its 
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state constitutional cause of action accrued not on the date that Ordinance 819 was adopted (i.e., 
February 23, 2006) and not on the date on which the Mountain Central decision was issued (i.e., 
February 19,2008), but, rather, when the full extent of Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment of its 
constitutionally protected property rights became apparent. As the above Statement of Facts 
confirms, this occurred on December 13,2007, when Alpine executed the Development 
Agreement for Alpine Village, committing to dedicate the Timbers units as community housing 
units. Under the undisputed facts of record, the earliest that this could be said to have occUlTed 
was on March 22,2007 when,for the first time, Alpine's proposed acquisition and dedication of 
the Timbers units as community housing units for Alpine Village was approved by the City 
Council. In either case, Alpine's filing of its Complaint on December 10,2010 was well within 
the allowable four-year statute of limitations. 
VI. The District Court erred in holding Alpine's Federal Takings Claims were not ripe. 
A. The District Court's Decision. 
The District Court held that Alpine's Federal takings claims were unripe because Alpine 
had failed to comply with the requirements of Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). R, Vol. 
III, p. 53l. In all of the prior briefing in this action, in both federal and state court, both Alpine 
and the City concurred that the "first prong" requirements of Williamson County were 
inapplicable to Alpine's claims. However, in its Decision, the District Court found to the 
contrary, sua sponte: 
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In this case, Alpine failed to contest the Development Agreement. In this case, 
Alpine was required to raise their objections with the local government in a timely 
and meaningful way in order to set up their claim that the exaction was 
involuntary .... In this case, Alpine proposed, executed and carried out a 
development agreement. Thus, the Court will find there is no final decision as 
spelled out in Williamson County. Williamson County went on to hold that where 
a regulatory taking is alleged against the state or local government agency, the 
property owner must first seek compensation through the procedures the state has 
provided for doing so before litigating the federal claim. In this case, Alpine 
failed to seek judicial review of the decision by the City. 
R. Vol. III, p. 530, L.25. 
In reaching its decision, the District Court appears to have blended together the concepts 
of a "final decision", voluntariness, judicial review and exhaustion of administrative remedies 
with the ripeness requirements of Williamson County. This blending and the conclusion which it 
produced are improper as a matter of law. 
B. The City Council reached a final decision on Alpine's Applications as required by 
Williamson County. 
In Williamson County, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
As the Court has made clear in several recent decisions, a claim that the 
application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not 
ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has 
reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the 
property at issue. 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186, 105 S. Ct. at 3116. 19 
19 See also; Adam Bros. Farming, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, 604 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010) 
which further identified the components of a final decision. 
"First, a final decision exists when (1) a decision has been made "about how a plaintiffs own land may be 
used" and (2) the local land-use board has exercised its judgment regarding a particular use of a specific 
parcel of land, eliminating the possibility that it may "soften[ ] the strictures of the general regulations [it] 
administer[s]. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 738-39, 117 S.Ct. 1659. 
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In applying the "final detennination" requirement, courts have emphasized that local 
decision-makers must be given an opportunity to review at least one reasonable development 
proposal before an as-applied challenge to a land use regulation will be considered ripe. E.g., 
Kinzli v. City o/Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the McCall City Code 
in place when Alpine submitted the Applications, the procedure for review of an "Inclusionary 
Housing Plan" was the same as for the subdivision application with which the Plan was 
submitted. R., Ex. II, (Ex. 1, p.ll §9.b.l). The Planning and Zoning Commission first reviewed 
the Plan and recommended approval or denial of the Plan to the City Council. The Council had 
responsibility for granting or withholding final approval. Thus, under the plain definition of 
"final decision", approval by the McCall City Council of the Applications, and of the associated 
mandated Inclusionary Housing Plan, constituted a "final decision" within the purview of 
Williamson County. Alpine's federal takings claims are based on this final decision. 
C. The City was fully aware that its Inclusionary Housing Ordinance was being 
challenged as unconstitutional when it elected to impose the Ordinance on Alpine. 
In its conclusion that Alpine had not satisfied the "final decision" component of 
Williamson County, the District Court faulted Alpine for its failure to formally object to the 
Development Agreement, a part of which included the required Inclusionary Housing Plan. 
First, it must be noted that the District Court did not cite any authority for the proposition that 
Alpine was required to state its "objection" to the Inclusionary Housing Ordinance, or, for that 
matter, to any other mandatory ordinance with which Alpine was required to comply in order to 
develop its property. Secondly, the only imaginable legitimate purpose to be served by such an 
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objection would be to place the City on notice that its Ordinance might be constitutionally or 
otherwise flawed. That purpose was certainly accomplished when, prior to any City Council 
final action on the Alpine Village Applications, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors filed a 
lawsuit against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinances 819 and 820 were facially 
unlawful and unconstitutional. Thus, faced with the unequivocal knowledge that the Community 
Housing Ordinances were being challenged, the City elected to continue to impose Ordinance 
819 on Alpine, requiring only that Alpine release claims stemming from the outcome of the 
Mountain Central Board of Realtors litigation " ... as to Community Housing Units which are 
sold pursuant to this [Community Housing] Plan prior to the final disposition of such litigation." 
(emphasis added). R, Ex. II, (Ex.16, p. 4, §7.1). The City elected to not suspend the enforcement 
of Ordinances 819 or 820 on pending applications, or to suspend the processing of pending 
applications. Simply put, the City proceeded not only with eyes wide open and full awareness of 
the potential risks of continuing to impose Ordinance 819 on Alpine, but also with full 
knowledge that Alpine was acquiring the Timbers units in order to comply with the Ordinance. 
D. Even if formally objecting to Ordinance 819 were otherwise deemed a requirement 
under Williamson County, it was not required in this case. 
In its conclusion that Alpine had not satisfied the "final decision" component of 
Williamson County, the District Court stated: " ... the first requirement of Williamson concerns 
administrative remedies for obtaining relief or compensation for a taking of property ... " R., Vol. 
III, p. 530, L. 16. Thus, the District Court's ruling on the Williamson "final decision" prong was 
essentially founded on an exhaustion of administrative remedies concept. The requirement that 
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an aggrieved party exhaust all administrative remedies as a prerequisite to bringing a "taking" 
claim was, indeed, discussed in KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), 
the other case besides Williamson County on which the District Court relied. The KMST Court 
held that, "As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the 
courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899,854 P.2d 
242 (1993)." KMST 138 Idaho at 583, 67 P.3d at 62. However, the opinion also acknowledged 
two well established exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. "We have recognized exceptions 
to that rule in two instances: (a) when the interests of justice so require, and (b) when the agency 
acted outside its authority." KMST, 138 Idaho at 583, 67 P.3d at 62. 
It can certainly be argued that both exceptions are established by the record in this case. 
At a minimum, the second exception clearly applies. Ordinance 891 was declared invalid and 
unconstitutional in the Mountain Central Decision. It is thus the law of this case that the City 
had no authority to impose any of the requirements of Ordinance 819 on Alpine. 
E. Alpine has complied with the second ripeness requirement of Williamson County. 
In order to meet the second prong requirement of Williamson County, which requires 
Alpine to seek and have been denied compensation through a state proceeding, Alpine was not 
required to seek judicial review of the City's final approval of the Applications, as appears to 
have been suggested by the District Court?O I.C. §67-6521(2)(b) expressly provides that an 
affected person may seek a judicial determination of whether a final action constitutes a taking 
20" Williamson County went on to hold that where a regulatory taking is alleged against the state or local government 
agency, the property owner must first seek compensation through the procedures the state has provided for doing so 
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by filing an inverse condemnation action under the provisions of Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14. 
Further, I.e. §67-6521(2)(b) exempts an affected person in such case from complying with the 
provisions of section (1) ofI.C. §67-6521.21 Alpine's Second Cause of Action seeks 
compensation for an unlawful taking/inverse condemnation under Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14 and, 
as such, satisfies the Williamson County ripeness requirement that compensation for the 'taking" 
must be sought through the appropriate state proceedings. As is noted above, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in the San Remo decision that an aggrieved party not only may, but must, join the 
federal takings claim in that state court proceeding. That is precisely what Alpine has done. 
VII. The District Court erred in holding that Alpine's Federal Takings Claims are time 
Barred by I.e. §5-219(4). 
A. The District Court's Decision. 
The District Court's holding that Alpine's federal takings claims are untimely under I.C. 
§5-219(4) is intertwined with its holding that Alpine's state inverse condemnation claim is 
barred by I.e. §50-219 and its holding that Alpine's federal claims are umipe under the 
Williamson County ripeness tests. The District Court held that: (i) If Alpine's federal takings 
claims survive the Williamson County ripeness tests, then they are subject to the two year statute 
before litigating the federal claim. In this case, Alpine failed to seek judicial review of the decision by the City." R. 
Vol. III, p. 531, L.6. 
21 I.C. § 67-6521(2)(b) states: "(b) An affected person claiming 'just compensation' for a perceived 'taking,' the 
basis of the claim being that a final action restricting private property development is actually a regulatory action by 
local government deemed "necessary to complete the development of the material resources of the state," or 
necessary for other public uses, may seek ajudicial determination of whether the claim comes within defined 
provisions of section 14, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho relating to eminent domain. Under these 
circumstances, the affected person is exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) of this section and may seek 
judicial review through an inverse condemnation action specifYing neglect by local government to provide 'just 
compensation' under the provisions of section 14, article I, of the constitution of the state of Idaho and chapter 7, 
title 7, Idaho Code." 
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oflimitations contained in I.e. §5-219(4); (ii) the federal takings claims accrued on December 
13,2007; and, (ii) the statute oflimitations began running on the claims 180 days after the 
accrual date. The District Court concluded: 
As discussed above, Alpine did not file a timely notice of claim with the City 
within 180 days after its state inverse condemnation claim arose on December 13, 
2007. That failure barred Alpine's Second Claim for Relief and, more 
importantly, deprived this Court of any jurisdiction to hear and grant relief for 
Alpine's state remedies. As a result I.C. §5-219, I.C. §6-906, and I.C. §6-908 
functioned as the state's denial of compensation or made Alpine's future efforts to 
obtain compensation under state remedies futile. By operation of these statutes, 
the bar on Alpine's state claims went into effect 181 judicial days after December 
13,2007, that is, on or around June 11,2008. Thus, the COUli finds that Alpine's 
remaining federal claims ripened and that I.C. §219(4) began to run on or around 
June 11, 2008. 
R., Vol. III, p. 532, L. 9. 
Alpine concurs with the District Court's holding that Alpine's federal takings claims do 
not ripen and the applicable statute of limitations on those claims does not begin to run until a 
final decision has been rendered denying Alpine compensation under its state inverse 
condemnation claim. However, a final decision on the merits of Alpine's state inverse 
condemnation claim has not yet been rendered. This is because of the District Court's improper 
holding that Alpine's noncompliance with I.C. §50-219 deprived the Court of jurisdiction to 
consider Alpine's claims that, for both constitutional and equitable reasons, Alpine's 
noncompliance with I.C. §50-219 should be excused. Until a decision on the merits of those 
defenses has been rendered, Alpine's federal takings claims have not accrued for statute of 
limitations purposes. 
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B. The applicable Statutes of Limitation. 
Alpine has pled two takings claims which are based on the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Alpine's First 
Cause of Action, Alpine pleads the takings claim "directly" under the Fifth Amendment. R., Vol. 
II, p. 203. Alpine is entitled to assert the takings claim directly under this Court's decision in 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, in which this Court held that: 
The Takings Clause is self-executing, and a takings claim may be based solely 
upon it, First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 
2378,96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), or it may be brought as an action under 42 Us.c. § 
1983, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd, 526 U.S. 687, 119 
S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). 
BHA Investments, Inc, 141 Idaho 175 n.2, 108 P.3d 322 n.2. 
In Alpine's Third Cause of Action, Alpine also pled the federal takings claim through 42 
U.S.c.A. § 1983. The two causes of action mayor may not be subject to the same statute of 
limitations. 
Under the U.S. Supreme COUli's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the 
§ 1983 claim is subject to I.C. §5-219( 4), which is Idaho's statute oflimitations for personal 
injury actions. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor this COUli have ruled on the issue of whether 
the same statute oflimitations would apply to Alpine's First Cause of Action (i.e. the direct 
assertion of the takings claim under the Fifth Amendment). Alpine contends that the direct claim 
should be found to be subject to I.C. §5-224, Idaho's four year statute oflimitations.22 However, 
because neither of the federal takings claims accrues for statute oflimitations purposes until a 
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final decision has been reached denying Alpine compensation under its state inverse 
condemnation cause of action, Alpine's federal takings claims are timely under either statute of 
limitations. 
C. Alpine's federal takings claims are timely, regardless of which statute of limitation 
is applied to them. 
Under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, Alpine's federal takings claims have not even 
accrued for statute oflimitations purposes until a final decision denying Alpine compensation on 
Alpine's state constitutional cause of action has been rendered by the courts ofIdaho. As the 
City conceded below, federal law governs the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to 
run on Alpine's federal claims. R., Vol. II, 326. 
In Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals directly addressed the issue of when a federal takings claim accrues, 
holding that: 
To determine when the statute of limitations period begins to run, we first must 
determine when the cause of action accrued. Determining when the cause of 
action accrues is merely the corollary to the ripeness inquiry ... "So long as the 
state provides 'an adequate process for obtaining compensation,' no constitutional 
violation can occur" until just compensation is denied. (cite omitted). Thus, a 
plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 action in federal court until the state denies 
just compensation. A claim under section 1983 is not ripe-and a cause of action 
under section 1983 does not accrue-until thatpoint. (emphasis added) .23 
The holding in Levald is the logical extension of the fundamental principles of evolving 
law regarding Fifth Amendment takings claims, as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. In its 
22 See City of Coeur d' Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, l36 P.3d 310 (2006); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. 
No.4, 139 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003). 
23 Accord, Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003). 
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Williamson County decision, the U.S. Supreme Comi held that a Fifth Amendment taking has 
not occurred until the aggrieved party has sought and been denied compensation under the state 
constitution. This principle was re-affirmed and extended by the Court in San Remo. The Comi 
in San Remo held that the aggrieved property owner was required to also present the Fifth 
Amendment takings claim to the state court as part ofthe Williamson "ripening" process, 
assuming that both the state and federal claims stem from the same set of facts. In San Remo, a 
hotel owner challenged an ordinance which required the payment of a fee for the conversion of 
residential rooms to tourist rooms. The hotel owner sought relief in state court, but purported to 
"reserve" its federal takings claims for assertion, if needed, in federal court. After the state 
courts rejected the hotel owner's state law-based takings claims, the owner filed an action in 
federal court, pleading the federal takings claim. The COUli found that the hotel owner was 
precluded from raising the federal takings claim in federal court, holding that: 
With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening, we reject 
petitioners' contention that Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from advancing 
their federal claims in state courts. The requirement that aggrieved property 
owners must seek "compensation through the procedures the State has provided 
for doing so," 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108, does not preclude state courts 
from hearing simultaneously a plaintiff s request for compensation under state 
law and the claim that, in the alternative, the denial of compensation would 
violate the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson 
County to preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would 
erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to "resort to 
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures." MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350, n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1986). 
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346, 125 S.Ct. at 2506. 
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Thus, it is entirely appropriate for Alpine to bring both the State and Federal 
Constitutional Claims in this action; and, under the above decisions, the federal claims do not 
accrue until this Court has ruled on Alpine's state inverse condemnation claim. As a result, 
whether the two year or the four year statute of limitation is applied to Al pine's federal claims, 
they are timely. This conclusion was, in part, the basis for U.S. District Judge Winmill's decision 
to remand this action, reasoning that: 
The accrual of a federal takings claim turns on the exhaustion of state remedies: 
"[T]he date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is denied in state courts, 
or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to state courts is futile." Hacienda 
Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (1993». There is no 
contention that the exhaustion requirement is futile here. Therefore, Alpine 
Village's federal claim does not accrue until compensation is denied in state 
court, and it appears that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run. 
R., Ex. II, (Ex. 29, p. 6). 
VIII. Alpine should be awarded its attorneys fees and costs incurred in this action. 
In the event that this Court reverses the decision of the District Court and holds in favor 
of Alpine on either its state inverse condemnation claim or its federal takings claims, then, as the 
prevailing party in this action, Alpine should be awarded its attorneys fees and costs incurred. 
Alpine made a timely pre-litigation demand on the City for compensation for the taking which is 
the subject of this action. No offer of compensation has ever been made by the City. As this 
Court has recognized, Alpine cannot be said to have recovered the just compensation to which it 
is constitutionally entitled if it is not also awarded the fees and costs which it was forced to incur 
in order to present its claims. In Ada County Highway Dist. By and Through Fairbanks v. 
Accarequi, 105 Idaho 873,673 P.2d 1067 (1983) this Court held that the recovery of fees by a 
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condemnee does not require a showing that the condemnor proceeded frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. In so ruling, the Accarequi Court cited with approval a decision rendered 
nearly eighty years earlier: 
The constitution requires that private property shall not be taken for public use, 
except on the payment of just compensation, and a man who is forced into court 
where he owes no obligation to the party moving against him, cannot be said to 
have received just compensation for his property if he is put to an expense 
appreciably important to establish the value of his property. He does not want to 
sell; the property is taken from him through the exercise of the high powers of the 
state, and the spirit of the constitution clearly requires that he shall not be 
compelled to part with what belongs to him without the payment, not alone of the 
abstract value of the property, but of all the necessary expenses incurred in fixing 
that value. 
Accarequi, 105 Idaho at 876; 673 P.2d at 1070. 
In the event that Alpine prevails on its federal takings claims, then attorneys fees are also 
authorized under 42 U.S.C.A. §1988. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein. Alpine respectfully requests that this Court: 
1. Reverse the District Court's Decision and Judgment granting summary judgment 
to the City; 
2. Grant summary judgment in favor of Alpine on its inverse condemnation claim 
under Art. I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution; 
3. If compensation is not ordered under the state inverse condemnation claim, then 
grant summary judgment in favor of Alpine on its takings claims under the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, directly and through 42 U.S.C.A § 1983; 
4. Award Alpine its attorneys fees and costs incurred on appeal; and, 
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5. Remand this case to the District Court to conduct a trial on the amount of 
compensation to which Alpine is entitled. 
DATED this day of May, 2012. 
MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN 
& PEMBERTON, LLP 
BY: 
~~~~~--------------
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Organization of the Report 
This report has 11 sections as follows: 
I. KEY FINDINGS - A brief synopsis of the key conclusions generated by this 
study and recommendations on how to address identified housing problems. 
II. DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW -- A quantitative demographic summary on the 
household population including number, size, composition, age and income. 
III. THE ECONOMY - Information on jobs, seasonality in employment, jobs by 
industrial sector, wages, and employment problems related to housing. 
IV. HOUSING INVENTORY - Information on the supply of housing units in the region 
including number, type, location, occupancy and tenure. 
V. MARKET OVERVIEW - An analysis of current rental and ownership housing 
market conditions and change in housing costs since 2000. 
VI. COMMUNITY HOUSING - A comparison of the demand for community housing 
relative to its supply taking into consideration housing that is now affordable 
for owners and renters by location and type and future development of 
housing for employees. 
VII. SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS -Information on the number of persons with 
special needs and the housing-related services and facilities provided by non-
profit agencies. 
VIII. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND FORECASTS -- Information on residential and 
commercial development. 
IX. COMMUNITY HOUSING DEMAND - Quantitative estimates of the number of 
community housing units now needed and how that number may change in 
the future. 
X. BARRIERS TO COMMUNITY HOUSING - An assessment of a wide variety of 
barriers that might be faced by those who need community housing and 
those that attempt to provide it for them. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - A summary of conclusions 
generated by the study and recommendations to address the identified 
housing needs that are responsive to opportunities in the area. 
This report is supplemented by profiles on each municipality and both counties with 2000 
Census data on households and housing, a comparison of key indicators from 1990 and 
2000, income estimates for 2005 and employment figures for 2000 through 2004. While 
these individual community profiles provide baseline data against which change can be 
measured, growth since 2003 has been so rapid compared to historical levels that trends 
between 1990 and 2000 do not adequately reflect current conditions. The profiles 
should therefore be interpreted with the information on changes since 2003 contained in 
the main report. 
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• AMI - An abbreviation for the area median income, which is estimated annually 
by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for each county. 
HUD publishes income estimates as a percentage of the median by household 
size. 
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• Incomes will increase but the percentage of households with low incomes 
(approximately 40% of all households in 2000 or an estimated 2,080 households 
in 2005) will probably not decrease. 
• The homeownership rate will likely decrease as proportionately more households 
are unable to purchase and therefore must rent. 
Job-generating development, both residential and commercial, that started in early 2004 
is fueling the demand for housing yet the private market has not responded by producing 
a sufficient supply of units priced to be affordable for employees. 
• Building permits were issued for nearly 1,800 new residential units between 2000 
and May 2005. This equates to an increase in housing units of approximately 
18% since the 2000 Census was conducted. 
• In 2004, permits were issued for 531 new residential units in Valley County, 
which is more than three times the number issued in 2000. 
• The labor shortage is impacting all sectors, from restaurants and retail to 
education and medical care. Employers report that all types of employees at all 
levels are having difficulty finding housing. 
• The greatest increase in employment has been in the construction industry with 
roughly 700 to 1,000 construction workers in the region during the peak summer 
season. Roughly 80% to 90% are from outside of the region and compete with 
lower-wage employees for housing. 
• Growth and construction will not end when Tamarack is fully built out. Ample 
land is available in the rest of the region for development to continue into the 
foreseeable future. The total number of lots approved but vacant and available 
for development in Valley County could easily exceed 10,000 before the end of 
the year. 
In order to address the housing shortage, construction of new units specifically targeting 
low- to middle-income households will be required. 
• Based on development that has occurred since 2003, new permanent jobs have 
generated demand for approximately 210 housing units. Of these, 145 units or 
69% should be affordable for low- and moderate-income households and 65 
units or 31% should be target households with incomes at or above the median. 
These estimates do not include permanent or temporary housing needed for 
construction workers. 
• If growth continues at the same level as in 2004 and the first five months of 2005, 
approximately 200 additional units will be needed in the next two years. 
• Based solely on the number of applications on wait lists the number of seniors 
occupying low-income family apartments, 35 to 40 additional rental units for low-
income seniors are needed at this time. 
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• Facilitate/encourage the development of entry-level homeownership 
opportunities in both Adams and Valley counties that is deed restricted for 
permanent affordability. 
• Encourage non-profit housing organizations to develop housing and expand 
housing programs in the area. 
• Provide City and County general funds for housing or establish a local source of 
revenue specifically for community housing since new development can not be 
required to address existing housing deficiencies. 
• Provide publicly-owned land for community housing projects. 
• Improve local record keeping systems to monitor development activity, calculate 
the housing demand generated by this development, assess changes in the 
housing supply, identify trends and evaluate progress toward meeting housing-
related goals. 
• Modify Comprehensive Plans to provide vision, explicit goals and quantitative 
objectives for community housing. Amend zoning and development codes to 
include incentives for community housing development. 
• Address public perceptions about community housing in a proactive manner. 
• Require that community housing be provided as part of all annexations. 
• Provide permanent housing for construction workers and their families to more 
fully reap the economic benefits of the construction boom. 
• Develop mobile home parks since additional residents of existing parks will likely 
be displaced in the future. 
• Develop a homebuyer education/counseling program so that employees can 
qualify to purchase homes that are developed. 
• Assist non-profits to provide emergency shelter and transitional housing for 
victims of domestic violence, and include units targeted for persons with special 
needs in all community housing projects. 
• Develop rental housing for low-income seniors and explore other housing options 
for retirees that will reduce the extent to which they compete with employees for 
housing. 
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Even though it is likely that the population estimates are low since they do not take into 
account the very recent growth that has occurred in the region, it is still appropriate to 
use them for certain purposes provided that it is recognized that the resulting figures 
probably understate the situation. The analysis of unmet housing demand contained 
later in this report is not based in any way on these population figures but rather is 
calculated by using job generation rates applied to development since 2003 .. 
Number of Households 
Analysis of housing demand and needs is not based on individuals but rather 
households. While some of these households consist of only one person living alone, 
most have multiple members. There are at least 5,266 households in the two-county 
region, with 71 % residing in Valley County. 
Household Population Estimates 
1990 Census 2000 Census 2005 Estimate 
Adams County 1251 1,421 1,511 
Council 319 339 338 
New Meadows 207 208 192 
Valley County 2404 3,208 3,755 
Cascade 353 421 469 
Donnelly 52 55 58 
McCall 824 902 1,151 
Sources: 1990 and 2000 Census; 2005 estimates equal the population in 2005 divided by the 
projected 2005 household size. 
Household Size 
The average size of households declined throughout the two-county region between 
1990 and 2000 as was generally the case throughout the nation. Households in the 
McCall area are smaller than in the rest of the region while Donnelly and New Meadows, 
the closest communities to McCall, have the largest households, on average. This 
suggests that singles are attracted to McCall whereas most of the households in its 
neighboring communities are families. 
Average Household Size Estimates 
1990 2000 2005 
{Census} {Census} Estimate 
Adams CouDty 2.59 2.42 2.34 
Council 2.57 2.29 2.16 
New Meadows 2.58 2.56 2.55 
Vall§y COLlflty __ . 2.51 2.36 2.29 
Cascade 2.46 2.32 2.25 
Donnelly 2.60 2.51 2.47 
McCall 2.37 2.25 2.19 
Sources: 1990 and 2000 Census; 2005 estimates assume that the 
average household size changed at the same yearly rate between 2000 
and 2005 as between 1990 and 2000. 
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There are relatively few roommate households in the region - 4% in Adams County and 
5% in Valley County. The percentage is only slightly higher among renter households 
(8% in 2000) even though most roommate households rent. This will change, however, 
as limited housing availability and rising costs force unrelated individuals to live together. 
The percentage of persons who live alone should decrease over time. 
Household Composition, Renter Households 




Source: 2000 Census 
Family Households 
56% 
There were few racial/ethnic minorities living in the region in 2000. Less than 2% of 
households had a Hispanic or Latino householder. The percentage was slightly higher 
in Valley County than in Adams County. The remodeling of the Whitetail Lodge in the 
late 1990's was the first large project to import Hispanic workers from outside of the 
region . Since then , the number of jobs held by Hispanics has been increasing according 
to the Job Service Office but is still probably under 5%. Obtaining accurate estimates in 
the future on the Hispanic population will be difficult due to the immigration status of 
some workers. 
Households by Race/Ethnicity 
Adams Council New Valley Cascade Donnelly McCall 
CounlY Meadows CounlY 
White 96.7% 97.6% 96.2% 97.3% 96.7% 96.4% 97.6% 
Black or African Amer. 0.1 % 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Am, Indian/Alaska 1.4% 1.5% 1.4% 0,7% 0.5% 1.8% 0.4% 
Native 
Asian 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0,2% 0,5% 0,0% 0,0% 
Hawaiian/ Pacific 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Islander 
._,--- - - - .. _-_ .. --- -
••• _ . _ _ __ •• 0 _ ____ __ _ 
Some other race 0,6% 0.3% 0,5% 0,6°/; 0.7% 1.8% 1.0% 
Two or more races 1.2% 0,6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.7% 0,0% 1,0% 
... _---- - - -_._ • ... _- -~---- --.-.-. ---- -.. - ----- - -_." - --.--~ --- ------ - . . --
Hispanic or Latino 1,0% 0.6% 1.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.8% 1,9% 
Source: 2000 Census 
The percentage of households with a Hispanic/Latino householder will likely continue to 
increase based on trends in other western mountain resort counties. For example, the 
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Council New Valley Cascade Donnelly McCall 
Meadows County 
------~-- ----~--
15 to 24 years 2.1% 3.8% 3.8% 2.3% 2.4% 3.6% 4.2% 
9.4% 16.3% 9.5% 9.5% 18.2% 11.8% 





35 to 44 years 19.4% 
45 to 54 years 23.4 % 
55t064y~~~ 21.0% 
65 to 74 years 15.6% 
75 to~~}'ears 7.4% 
85+ years 2.8% 




















22.6% 23.6% 20.1% 
22.6% 20.0% 26.9% 
.~--~~----~=-16.4% 14.5% 16.5% 
15.4% 7.3% 11.1% 
7.1% 12.7% 7.6% 
4.0% 0.0% 1.8% 
The 2000 Census measured household incomes in 1999. At that time, the median 
household income ranged from around $24,000 in Council to nearly $37,000 per year in 
McCall and Valley County as a whole. 
Median Incomes in 1999 
Median in 1999 Adams Council New Valley Cascade Donnelly McCall 
_G()lmty Meadows County __ 
--
----
Household Income $28,423 $24,375 $28,500 $36,927 $32,411 $29,583 $36,250 
Owner Households $31,996 
--- -
$28,333 $34,167 $39,287 $35,769 $41)50 $43,088 
Renter Households $20,395 $15,568 $20,625 $27,582 $22,917 $18,125 $25,588 
-.family Income $32,335 $30,000 $31,042 $42,283 $37,813 $31,500 $46,420 
Per Capita Income $14,908 $15,170 $11,884 $19,246 $17,330 $11,142 $18,479 
Source: 2000 Census 
Every year, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) publishes 
county level median income estimates for four-person families. These estimates are 
then used to adjust the income levels that can be served by Federal housing subsidy 
programs. According to HUD, the median family income in Valley County increased 
nearly 40% between 1999 and 2005. It increased at a higher rate in Adams County -
over 42%. 
Change in Median Family Income, 1999 - 2005 
1999 2005 % 
~_ _____ ChCl!!9~ 
t.E~_rr1sCounty_ $33,500 $47,70Q __ 4?.40% 
Valley County $35,800 $49,900 39.40% 
Source: 2000 Census and HUD 
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class should decline relative to both lower-income and higher-income households. With 
the creation of new low-wage retail and service positions, there will be proportionately 
more low-income households. Although wages will rise at all levels due to the labor 
shortage causing the median income to increase, the percentage of households with 
incomes below 80% AMI will probably also increase. The percentage of upper-income 
households is also likely to increase with wealthy retirees and investors attracted to the 
region for the resort lifestyle, and increased business opportunities in the area, 
particularly in real estate investment and development. 
Income Distribution, 2000 
OAdams County 
a ValleyCounly 1--------------, 
5.0% 
0.0% 
Less than $5,000 · $10,000 - $15,000· $20,000 · $25,000· $35,000· $50,000 · $75,000 · $100,000· $150,000 
$5,000 $9,999 $14,999 $19,999 $24,999 $34,999 $49,999 $74,999 $99,999 $149,999 or more 
Source: 2000 Census 
Homeowners have considerably higher incomes than renters. In 1999, approximately 
one-third of renter households had annual gross incomes of $15,000 or less. Nearly 
30%, however, had incomes of $35,000 or more. This indicates that mixed income 
rental housing would be more appropriate than rentals serving only very low income 
households. 
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The AMI estimates published each year by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) are adjusted for household size. For example, the low income 
maximums (S80% AMI) in Valley County equal $31 ,950 for two-person households and 
$39,900 for a household with four members. 
Income Amounts by Percentage of Area Median Income 
_ ~~~.~_~_~~.~~~y ___ -::-:5-=-0-=%-=-=-_~::_::80__=olc:_::_o ... ........ __ 100_% __ 
1 person $16,700 $26,700 $33,400 
2 person $19,100 $30,550 $38,200 
_~_l?~!§Q.Q. $21 ,450 $34,~50 $42,900 
.. A.RE?r§9Q ...... . J.~~&@._.. $38,150 HIlQQ .... _ 
5 person $25,750 $41,200 $51,500 
6 person $27,650 $44,250 $55,300 
.y_al~~}'~~unty _...._§_O°Ic_o ._ ... _ ... _._8!>.!o .......... 1.!l.Q!~_ 
1 person $17,450 $27,950 $34,900 
2 person $19,950 $31,950 $39,900 
. _~p~r~~~... .. _.. ~?~!450 _._ .. .E~,95QJ±1,~Q_ 
4 person $24,950 $39,900 $49,900 
5 person $26,950 $43,100 $53,900 
6 person $28,950 $46,300 $57,900 
Source: HUD 
In the two counties combined, approximately 40% of all households have low incomes. 
This equates to a 2005 estimate of 2,080 households with incomes equal to or less than 
80% AMI. Just over half of these households have very low or extremely low incomes. 
39% 
Income by AMI, Valley and Adams Counties Combined 
100-120% 
11% 





Adams County has proportionately more low-income households than Valley County 
(48% compared to 36%) although in absolute terms, there are more low-income 
households in Valley County (1,359) than in Adams County (719). 
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Income figures can be translated into affordable rents and purchase prices. First, the 
amount that is affordable for each income category is determined based on 30% of 
gross income equaling the monthly affordable housing payment. For example, in Valley 
County, a low-income family of three can afford a housing payment of up to $899 per 
month. 
Affordable Housing Payment 
Adams County 50% AMI 80% AMI 100% AMI 
Very Low Low Moderate 
Income Income Income 
- - --------------
-----$418 $668 $835 1 person 
-- ---------- $478 $764 $955 2 person 
3 person ·$536 $859 $1,073 
4 person $596 $954 $1,193 
5 person $644 $1,030 $1,288 
6 person $691 $1,106 $1,383 
Valley County 50% 80% 100% 
1 person $436 $699 $873 
2 person $499 $799 $998 
3 person $561 $899 $1,123 
4 person $624 $998 $1,248 
5 person $674 $1,078 $1,348 
6 person $724 $1,158 $1,448 
These housing payments are then translated into affordable purchase prices. The 
maximum that low-income households can afford to pay for homes ranges from $89,500 
for a one-person household in Adams County to $155,100 for a six-person household in 
Valley County. Since most households in the region have two or three members, the 
targeted range for affordable homeownership for low-income households should 
primarily be in the $100,000 to $120,000 range. Note that these are the maximum 
amounts affordable for households with incomes at 80% AMI. To serve households with 
incomes lower than this, purchase prices would have to be lower. Households with 
incomes at 100% AMI can generally afford homes priced up to $150,000. 
Affordable Purchase Prices for Low-Income Households 
Household Size Adams County Valley County 
_.Lperson. __ $89,50o_______ . $~3,EiO.Q... __ 
2 person $102,300 $107,000 
3 person $115,000 $120,400 
_4pers()n_______ _ __ ~127,~QO __ . $1~~,700_ 
5 person $138,000 $144,400 
6 person $148,200 $155,100 
Assumes 20% of payment goes toward taxes, insurance and fees with 80% covering principal and interest 
on a 30 year fixed-rate mortgage at 6.5% and down payments equaling 5% of the purchase price. 
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The Idaho Department of Commerce and Labor projects modest gains in employment 
through 2010 of about 100 jobs in Valley County each year and 20 new jobs annually in 
Adams County. These projections seem low, particularly for Valley County, given the 
amount of development that is now occurring (see DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND 
FORECASTS section of this report). 
Seasonality in Employment 
The summer months have historically been the peak employment season with 
approximately 1,000 more jobs during July and August than during February and March. 
The McCall office of the Idaho Department of Labor and Employment reports that there 
have been labor shortages during the summer months for many years. Note that these 
estimates are for positions covered by the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages 
(QCEW, formerly referred to as ES 202 data) and do not include sole proprietors and 















Valley County QCEW Employment by Month: 
2001-2004 (2nd quarter) 
-
~ 
~ .. -~ 
"": -- ~ - "!..r -
- -- - - - -
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - --
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct 
3,217 3,123 3,107 3,231 3,352 3,821 3,949 3,902 3,668 3,379 
3,133 3,087 3,048 3,134 I 3,298 3,708 3,988 3,975 3,736 3,508 
3,196 3,097 3,074 3,192 3,421 3,910 4,094 4,082 3,815 3,577 
3,358 3,314 3,309 3,371 3,631 4,121 
"" 
- - - - --
-
- -- - - - --
- --- -





Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note: ali 2004 figures are "preliminary". 
The seasonal employment pattern in Adams County is similar to that in Valley County. 
There are approximately 275 more employees working during the summer months, the 
peak employment season, than during the winter. 
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While service-producing jobs have been on the increase, goods-producing jobs declined 
between 2001 and 2003. This trend is likely to continue at least into the near term 
based on the type of commercial growth now occurring in Valley County. Efforts to 
promote a diversified economy and create more manufacturing jobs, which are less 
subject to the consequences of drought. national recessions and declines in tourism, will 
be made difficult by the competition for employees that service businesses will pose. 
Valley County QCEW Employment: 
2001 to 2003 
4,000 
3,500 
3,432 total 3,538 total 
til 
<II 3,000 <II 




... 1,500 <II 
.Q 




2001 2002 2003 
' Goods-producing includes agriculture/forestry/fishing , mining, construction and manufacturing; service-
providing includes all other NAICS-defined trades . 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
In Valley County: 
• Most job growth has been in the construction, accommodation and food services, 
and arts/entertainmenUrecreation. 
• Manufacturing had a steep decline between 2002 and 2003 with the closure of 
the lumber mill in Cascade. 
• The number of retail jobs has been holding steady as a percentage of total 
employment. This should change in the coming years as stores open to serve 
both an increase in visitors and an increase in the population that is spurred by 
job growth . 
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2001 to 2003 
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1,000 ____ ~Q.5_ tptaJ __ _____ ____ ,?;l~ tqt~l __ _ . ____ ___ ~QI toJC!I . _ .. __ 





2001 2002 2003 
June 2005 
'Goods-producing includes agriculture/forestrylfishing , mining, construction and manufacturing; service-providing 
includes all other NAleS-defined trades. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Many of the employers In Adams County have not been disclosing their industrial 
classifications when filing their quarterly reports. Because of this, it is difficult to analyze 
how the economy of the county might be changing . It appears that the number of retail 
jobs is holding about steady. The greatest job gains between 2001 and 2003 were in the 
health care and social assistance sector. 
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• The amount of construction activity has attracted contractors from Boise, Oregon 
and other areas who bring crews with them and who may report employment 
through their home office; and, 
• Contractors and sub-contractors often pay cash for laborers and do not report 
them as employees. 
As of 2003, the Idaho Department of Labor and Employment estimated that 8.9% of the 
jobs held in Valley County were in construction. This would equate to about 530 jobs 
based on estimated 2005 total employment levels. This estimate is low. The Tamarack 
Resort reports that 525 construction workers were on site during the 2004 summer 
season not including those building custom estate homes. They anticipate that 
construction employment will increase this year as work begins on a conference center 
and employee housing, and continues on the Members Lodge and residential units. It is 
likely that between 700 and 1,000 employers are working in construction in the region. 
Construction activity should remain at high levels for many years to come. Although 
Tamarack should be largely built out in less than 10 years, development in the nearby 
communities and on lots in the unincorporated areas of both counties should continue 
well beyond on-site construction at Tamarack. There is ample land available for 
residential and commercial development in the region. Even if new construction is 
curtailed at some point in the future due to limited land or infrastructure availability, 
remodeling should generate many jobs. In other western mountain communities, 
ownership of large luxury homes changes frequently with new owners often undertaking 
extensive remodeling. 
Wages 
While wages increased overall between 2001 and 2003, increases in service providing 
jobs were responsible for the gain in the average annual pay. With the loss of the Boise 
Cascade mill, the average annual pay for employees holding goods-producing jobs 
dropped sharply - down 13.2% from 2001 to 2003. The McCall office of the Idaho 
Department of Commerce and Labor reports that wages have been noticeably 
increasing since 2003 although data have not yet been published quantifying these 
gains. 
Average Annual Pay per Worker - Valley County 
2001 2002 2003 




Service-providing $21,387 $21,809 $22,412 4.8% ~~~~c~~~~~~~~~~.~~ __ 
Goods-producing $24,421 $25,255 $21,206 -13.2% 
Wages have also been increasing in Adams County; the increase has been greater than 
in Valley County. While wages for goods producing jobs remained flat or declined 
slightly between 2002 and 2003, they were up from 2001 levels. 
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There have been multiple reports of new employees unable to find housing in Valley 
County who have moved to New Meadows. Builders estimate that 80% to 90% of their 
workers are from the Boise area, Oregon, California or other areas outside of the region. 
They commute back and forth to their permanent homes every week or two. 
Where Residents Work and Where Workers Live: Adams County 
Year 2000 
Where Residents of 
Adams County Work 
# % 
Adams County .1~~ __ -.l4.7% 
Adarrl~J2()LJnJL_ 175 12.7% 
Other 172 12.5% 
TOTAL 1,374 
Source: 2000 Census 
Where Workers in 









There are numerous negative consequences associated with dependency on a labor 
force that commutes including: 
Leakage 
Employees who have homes elsewhere leave the county with their paychecks. Wages 
are not spent locally, sales tax is not generated and local governments do not receive 
the revenue required to provide public services and infrastructure for which there is 
increasing need. Retaining wealth and maximizing the circulation of dollars that come 
into an area are key principals of economic sustainability. The more that wages are 
earned in the county but spent elsewhere, the less the local economy and communities 
will benefit from the development and job growth that is occurring. The loss of much of 
the construction payroll to areas where workers are retaining their primary homes 
reduces the economic benefit the region could be receiving from the current construction 
boom. 
Employment Problems 
As commuting increases, employers will experience increases in the frequency that 
employees are late or do not show up for work often due to inclement weather, car 
problems and child care issues. Turnover also increases as commuters tire of the time 
and expense involved in commuting and seek employment closer to home. Tardiness, 
absenteeism and turnover are direct costs to employers. Encouraging or requiring 
employers to contribute to the provision of employee housing close to work would 
improve economic sustainability. 
Parking 
Employees who commute in from homes outside of the county generally do so by car 
thus necessitating that parking be provided for their vehicles. Over time, parking will 
become more limited as it is not the economically highest and best use for increasingly 
expensive land. Building parking spaces for employees can get very expensive, 
particularly as surface options disappear and multi-level parking structures are required. 
The subsidy needed to develop nearby employee housing can be less than the cost of 
building parking for employees who commute. 
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Most of the employers reported that their employees live near where they work. Long-
distance commuting has not yet become common. While they are not yet experiencing 
the types of employment problems typically associated with commuting (absenteeism, 
tardiness) they are finding that they must fill jobs with candidates who are less qualified 
than desired. 
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Location of Units 
Nearly 70% of the region's occupied housing units are in Valley County. McCall has the 
most primary homes of any community; however, the majority of occupied housing units 
are in the unincorporated areas. Nearly 60% of all occupied units in the region are in 
rural unincorporated areas. Over 40% of the occupied units in the two-county region are 
rural Valley County. 
In both Valley and Adams counties, there are far more units located in the rural areas 
than in all of the municipalities combined . This rural development pattern has 
implications on the desirability and acceptance of community housing . Medium- to high-
densities are required to make housing affordable for low- and moderate-income 
households. Achieving these densities will require central water and sewer treatment 
generally available only in or near towns. The rural lifestyle with single-family homes on 
acreage will not be affordable as the price of land continues to rise, even for middle-
income families . Households moving to the area will not be able to have the lifestyle that 
longer-term residents have been able to obtain. Many of the children growing up in the 
region will not be able to afford the size and quality of home on acreage that their 





Occupied Housing Units by Location 
McCall Council 
7% 
Valley County Other 
41 % 
Source: 2000 Census 
New Meadows 
Adams County Other 
19% 
Over half of the residential units in Valley County (54%) and almost 40% in Adams 
County were occupied only occasionally or seasonally. These residential units do not 
function as housing but are rather second homes and vacation accommodations, which 
generate demand for housing through direct jobs on site (housekeeping, yard 
maintenance, etc.) and indirectly by jobs in the retail and service sectors. If the 
relationship between primary homes and seasonal units shifts with a disproportionate 
increase in the number of seasonal units relative to primary homes, the lack of employee 
housing will be compounded. 
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Unit Type 
Nearly three-fourths of the residential units in both Valley and Adams counties are 
single-family homes. The percentages are lower in all of the incorporated communities 
but still in excess of 60%. 
Multi-family units (condominiums, apartments, duplexes, etc.) comprise a small 
percentage of total residential units relative to the unit mix in most mountain resort 
communities where land prices are high. McCall, the most resort-oriented of the 
communities in the two-county region, has the highest concentration of multi-family units 
(34%). As land prices in the region rise and the demand for vacation accommodations 
increases, it is likely that proportionately more multi-family units will be built. Most of the 
renter-occupied units in the two-county region are scattered single-family houses, mobile 
homes and condominiums. There are few apartments, which are typically one of the 
most affordable types of housing. 
The change will be most noticeable in communities like Donnelly where less than 3% of 
the units are now multi-family. The increased urbanization associated with multi-family 
development may be considered unattractive by residents who want to preserve their 
rural lifestyles. The developments most likely to be impacted by negative reaction to 
increased densities and urbanization are the lower cost, more affordable projects that 
provide community housing since they typically offer less open space and lower-quality 
exterior finishes compared to high-end resort condominiums. 
Residential Units by Type 
Single-Family Multi-Family Mobile Homes 
Adams County 1,476 74.5% 107 5.4% 344 17.4% 
Council 276 65.6% 63 15.0% 57 13.5% 
---- --- --------------
New Meadows 166 64.1% 29 11.2% 64 24.7% 
Valley County 5,958 73.7% 955 11.8% 917 11.3% 
-- - ------------ ------------
Cascade 390 67.0% 82 14.1% 105 18.0% 
Donnelly 62 78.5% 2 2.5% 13 16.5% 
---------------
McCall 1,378 60.8% 776 34.3% 106 4.7% 
Source: 2000 Census 
A relatively large percentage of residential units in the region are mobile homes - 11 % in 
Valley County and 17% in Adams County. In New Meadows, nearly one-quarter of all 
residential units are mobile homes. McCall has the lowest concentration (under 5%) yet 
still has over 100 mobile homes. Mobile homes typically cost less than any other type of 
housing, both to rent and to own. 
In other western mountain resort communities, mobile home parks have often been 
redeveloped and replaced with higher-priced, more profitable homes. The escalating 
price of land and housing demand have made the parks financially less attractive than 
other types of housing. Commercial revitalization/redevelopment has also taken its toll 
on mobile home parks since many have been located near downtown areas. 
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Adams County Council New Meadows Valley County Cascade Donnelly McCall 
Source: 2000 Census 
The other communities in the region are likely to become more like McCall in terms of 
owner/renter mix as they shift more from a historical dependence on the lumber industry 
and summer tourism to become more year-round resorts. Having proportionately more 
renters relative to owners may not be considered desirable by many but is likely to be 
the situation in the future. 
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Rents have increased roughly 35% to 50% since 2000. The greatest increases have 
been in Valley County, particularly in the McCall and Donnelly areas. 
Median Rents in 2000 
2000 Adams Council New Valley Cascade Donnelly McCall 
Coun.\y _______________ ty1eadows County __ _____ __ 
_ ____ 0_ - -
Gross Rent $395 $319 $506 $505 $446 $483 $548 
Contract Rent $314 $235 $376 $431 $363 $395 $502 
Source: 2000 Census 
Although rents have increased substantially since 2000, the variation in rates by location 
appears to be comparable to the situation in 2000. Rates are highest in McCall and 
lowest in Council. Rents in New Meadows are similar to those in Donnelly and Cascade, 
and significantly higher than in the southern portion of Adams County 








Adams County Council New Meadows Valley County Cascade Donnelly McCall 
Source: 2000 Census 
Rental Availability 
Property managers, leasing agents and landlords report very few, if any vacancies. 
They indicate that occupancy levels have always been high during the summer months 
but have increased significantly in the last two years during the winter. 
For-rent newspaper notices in the Star News in McCall provide indications about rental 
availability. The notices from the Star News were utilized for this analysis since it has 
Rees Consulting, Inc. Page 40 
Addendum 1 - Housing Needs Assessment 
June 2005 
Average Number of Notices per Week by Month 
35 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Source: The Star-News in McCall 
In the first eight months of 2004, the number of notices published was significantly lower 
(52%) than the number published in 2003, indicating that availability of rentals had 
declined. This changed, however, starting in September 2004. The reason for the jump 
in for-rent notices during the final four months of 2004 may be attributed to an increase 
in the number of units placed on the long-term rental market. This is supported by 
comments from property managers that the number of units they manage has recently 
increased. This increase is most likely due to recognition by property owners/investors 
that rents are rising and that winter seasonal vacancies are decreasing as a result of the 
opening of Tamarack, which improves the financial attractiveness of long-term rentals. 
This situation is not likely to continue, however. Assuming current trends continue, the 
price of new homes will increase to the extent that investors can not afford to purchase 
them for rentals. At the same time, owners of single-family homes and condominiums 
that have been rented long term will be tempted to sell for gains far above what they 
receive in rents. Since such a small percentage of the rental supply consists of 
apartment units that will remain as rentals over time, in all probability, the supply of long-
term rentals will decrease in the next few years. The possible removal of mobile home 
parks would contribute further to a reduction in rental availability. 
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2004 Median Prices by Location 
Cascade Donnelly McCall Counc il New Meadow s All Areas 
Source: Mountain Central MLS 
In 2004, approximately 34% of homes sold in the region cost less than $150,000. Of 
these 154 homes, 10 were in New Meadows, 30 in Council , 61 in McCall , 34 in Cascade 
and 19 in Donnelly. At the other end of the price spectrum, 17 homes were sold for 
prices at or above $500,000. Most of these (13 of the 17) were in the McCall area . 
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The following chart illustrates the rapid escalation in median prices. It should be noted 
that these increases do not reflect the rate of appreciation in individual homes. The 
increase in the median is due to a combination of property appreciation and the 
development of new high-priced homes. 
Median Prices Compared, 2004 Sales and Active Listings 
$ 400 ,000 
$ 350 ,000 
$300,000 
$250 ,000 
$2 00 ,000 




Cascad e Donn elly McCall Coun cil New Mea dows All Area s 
Source: Mountain Central MLS 
A comparison of 2005 list prices to home values in 2000 shows increases in the median 










Valley Cascade Donnelly McCall 
County 
$141 ,200 $95,300 $70,000 $151 ,300 Median Value 2000 
Single Family Homes 
Median Value 2000 
All Units 
.--.----~ - - ............ --.-------c- -$99,500 $61 ,500 $77,900 $134,200 $87,400 $69,100 $147,500 
._ .... _ .... _____ ·_··_·_··~·_H"',.'"_"."._""'._·,._ ....... _"_ .... 
Active Listings, 2005 N/A $194,500 $295,000 N/A $219,900 $287,000 $389,500 
All Units 
% Increase N/A 216% 279% N/A 152% 315% 164% 
Sales Volume and Activity 
The MLS tracked 446 sales in 2004. Real estate activity was dominated by activity in 
the McCall area where 57% of the homes sold in 2004 were located. It is interesting to 
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sales. As many as one-fourth to one-third of sales to year-round residents are to retired 
persons and others who are not employed in the area. As the demand for housing by 
non-employees continues to increase (see SPECIAL NEEDS section of this report on the 
growth in senior population) it will drive the demand for employee housing upward. 
Seniors and financially independent residents are high-rate consumers of goods and 
services, which generates jobs. At the same time, they compete with employees for 
housing thus limiting the supply of housing available to employees. 
Realtors also report that most of the year-round residents who are buying homes are 
new to the area. Most have recently-created jobs at Tamarack or with other businesses, 
especially those that are construction-related Very few of their clients are individuals or 
families that have been working and renting in the area for very long. 
Availability 
Realtors report the inventory of units listed for sale has declined sharply since 2003. As 
of April 21 st, a total of 195 residential units were listed for sale in the two counties 
combined. This represents a 5.3 month inventory based on the number of sales in 2004. 
In other words, 37 homes were sold on average each month in 2004. At this same rate, 
the 195 active listings will be sold in 5.3 months. An inventory of less than six months is 
generally considered to be a sellers market where buyers have few choices and limited 
ability to negotiate price. McCall has the smallest inventory relative to historical sales 
activity whereas the Cascade area has the largest. 
Active Listings at of April 21, 2005 
2004 Sales Active Months 
Listings Inventory 
Cascade 54 40 8.9 
Donnelly 61 48 9.4 
McCall 253 66 3.1 
" Council 41 23 6.8 
New Meadows 37 18 5.8 
All Areas 446 195 5.3 
Source: Mountain Central MLS 
Approximately 57% of the homes listed for sale were single-family houses on lots and 
another 26% were homes on acreage. 
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June 2005 
Total Cascade Donnelly McCall Council New 
Meadows 
< $100,000 13 5 0 2 5 1 $100,000 -$124,999~---~3~""·····~"-·2~-~-·~····O~~--~·1 ....•.. ° ·-·~·-·~O 
$125,000 -$149~-·· 6 :3 ° 
'-~n5o,-606-- $174,999-8----5·_---- 1 
1~~' ~--1-
-=-0--~2' 0 
-$175;000-$199,999---- 19 5 5 6 2 
-~--~------~----. $200,000 - $224,999 6 2 3 1 0 0 
$225,000 - $249,999 18 --=-6---~8-'--~3~--~1:------0:::--
$250,000 - $274,999 14 1 6 6 0 
$275~06()"-=12§9,999 18 3~-~ 5 3 2 
. $300,000 -$324,§99~- 7 - ---T 3 0 3 
$325,000 - $349,999 12 0 1 
$350,oocf=-$374,9999 7 1 1 
$375,000-$399,999 13 1 2 
$466, 666~-$424, 999 5 0 1 
$425,000 - $449,999 8 1 4 
$450,000 - $474,999 3 0 0 
$475;006=-$499,999 7 2 1 
$500,000+ ..... - 28---~2 7 
-- -- --------- ------
Total 
Total < $150,000 
Percent < $150,000 
Source: Mountain Central MLS 
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other hand are faced with rents that usually escalate every year, often at rates that 
exceed wage increases. 
Overcrowded Housing Units 
Approximately 127 of the region's housing units are overcrowded with more than one 
person per room. In most areas, overcrowding is not a widespread problem. In 
Donnelly, however, 20% of the occupied housing units in 2000 were overcrowded. The 
percentage was also higher in New Meadows (4.8%) than elsewhere in the region since 
small homes that once served as mill worker housing were moved there and are now 
occupied even though they are substandard. 
Overcrowding is likely becoming more prevalent as housing availability decreases and 
housing costs rise. 
Overcrowded Housing Units 
% Overcrowded Estimated 2005 # 
of Housing Units 
Adams County 2.0% 31 
Council 0.9% 3 
New Meadows 4.8% 9 
----------------- ------ - -- -----
\/alley 2.6% 96 
Cascade 1.9% 9 
Donnelly 20.0% 12 ~~M~c~C~a~IIL-~~~~~~~1~.5~%~o~~~~~--17 
Source: 2000 Census and Rees Consulting, Inc. estimate for 2005 
Home Heating 
It is important to consider the cost of utilities when considering housing affordability, 
especially in a mountain climate. The region is not served by natural gas. As such, 
most homes are heated with electricity or wood. These are generally inefficient and 
costly ways to heat residential units. All of the apartments that were researched as part 
of this study have electric heat. Landlords estimate that it typically costs about $250 per 
month to heat a two-bedroom apartment in the winter. Using more efficient heating 
systems in any community housing that is constructed in the future would make the 
homes more affordable over time. 
Rees Consulting, Inc. 
Type of Heat Used 
Other fuel/none 
9% Bottled, tank, or LP gas 
16% 
Source: 2000 Census with Rees Consulting, Inc. adjustment 
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None offer garages, covered parking, clubrooms, athletic facilities, business 
centers or amenities typically found in larger, newer apartment properties . 
• Design and size options are limited. None of the two-bedroom apartments have 
two bathrooms. None of the properties offer studios, which are the most 
affordable option for persons to live alone, and only Valley I has townhome-style 
apartments with two floors, which are desirable for families . 
• All of the apartment complexes are operating at or very near full occupancy. 
While a total of six units were reported vacant in early April, it was the result of 
turnover. Former tenants had just moved out and paperwork was being finalized 
for new residents to move in. There were 31 applicants on wait lists, which is 
more than six times the number of units that were empty. 
The Timbers is the only free-market apartment complex in the region where rents range 
from $550 to $675 per month. Rents were increased approximately $50 in the last year. 
They remain affordable for households with incomes at 80% of the median but are 
higher than what very low income households with incomes at or below 50% of the 
median can afford. While The Timbers now functions as community housing, it could 
become too expensive in the future for low-income households at or below 80% AMI. 
Valley I 
These 8 units are owned and operated by Western Idaho Community Action Partnership 
(WICAP). It is located at 210 Colorado behind the Woodman's Lodge in a residential 
area on site served by public transit and near the center of McCall. The property was 
constructed more than 10 years ago. It is the only project in the two-county area 
financed with tax credits and a HOME grant. It is generally well maintained and 
attractive. Units have in-unit washers and dryers. WICAP owns adjacent land suitable 
for apartment development. 
The Timbers 
This17-unit project in McCall was formerly named Ponderosa Arms. It is the only free-
market apartment project in the two-county area. Most of the project's tenants are 
roommate households and couples with children. Single-parent families have generally 
been unable to afford market rents. The project does not have any Section 8 voucher 
holders. 
Osprey Court 
This 17 -unit project was funded by Rural Development and primarily serves very low 
income households. Most are single parents with children although several are rented to 
single individuals, seniors and disabled persons. The project's amenities include a 
playground, central laundry and exterior storage lockers. 
The Claremont 
The 16-unit Claremont apartment project is located in Cascade. It was funded by 
USDA's Rural Development and is managed by Syringa Property Management. The 
project primarily serves low-income single-parent families and elderly. Management 
reports that they have more children living in the units than previously and that they 
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There are still a few homeownership opportunities for low- and moderate-income 
households. As of April 21 st, 22 units (single-family homes, condominiums and mobile 
homes on land) were listed for sale at or under $150,000 and therefore were affordable 
for households with incomes at 100% of the median. Of there, three were in the 
$100,000 to $125,000 range, which is the affordable target for households at 80% AMI. 
The remaining 13 were listed for sale at prices under $100,000. 
Cascade had the largest concentration of homes available for purchase by low- and 
moderate-income households - 10 out of 22. Six were in Council, four in McCall, two in 
New Meadows and none in Donnelly. Very few homes are now being built that will be 
affordable for low and moderate income buyers. 
The success of Jacob's Manor, a subdivision where recently constructed homes have 
been priced to be affordable for low-income buyers, is evidence of the strong demand for 
entry-level homeownership. The 32 new homes sold at a rate of over 3.5 units per 
month. Prices started at $132,500 but escalated to over $182,000. 
Mortgage Financing 
The availability of home mortgages appears adequate for most types of housing. 
Mortgage brokers and lenders offer a full array of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan 
products in addition to portfolio financing for purchasers with credit problems or unique 
circumstances. They have 100% financing for first-time buyers provided that a 
homebuyer education course is completed. They offer stated-income loans for buyers 
who have undocumented income and can work with buyers who have a seasonal 
employment history. They face several obstacles, however including: 
• Difficulty financing manufactured housing. 
• Inability to provide loans for condominium projects that include time share units. 
• Difficulty financing multi-family units because there are so few comparable 
properties. 
Rural Development has a homebuyer program for low-income buyers (incomes at or 
below 80% AMI) through which below market rate mortgages with effective interest rates 
of 1 % are offered. The program has sufficient funding to serve increased demand from 
Valley and Adams counties. 
Boise-based Neighborhood Housing Services, a non profit Community Housing 
Development Organization, operates in all but two counties in Idaho and has the ability 
to serve Valley and Adams counties. The organization has budgeted to provide four 
second mortgages in the two counties in conjunction with Rural Development's below 
market home loan program for income-qualified entry-level home buyers. 
Temporary Housing 
RV parks are becoming increasingly used for employee housing. In the Cascade area, 
one park owner reports that about 20% of sites are occupied on a long-term basis during 
the summer. In Donnelly, one park has been master leased by a large contractor for 
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Construction contractors are master leasing houses and condominiums for their 
employees to live in while they work in the area. One has also master leased an RV 
park. 
While employer assistance can be one component of a comprehensive housing strategy 
aimed at providing a sufficient workforce to support a sustainable economy, 
opportunities are limited and can have negative consequences. Most employers do not 
have any land for the construction of housing and do not have residential development 
expertise. With escalating housing prices, they can not afford to purchase homes for 
their workers. Even if they could afford to purchase or master lease housing, this 
removes housing from the market that would be otherwise available for employees who 
work for employers that can not afford to provide housing assistance, and further drives 
up housing prices. Tamarack is an example of this. Master leasing of six homes in the 
Donnelly area has made it more difficult for other employees in the area to find rental 
housing. Tamarack leases three four-bedroom homes for $1,700 per month each, which 
is considerably higher than what the prevailing market rates have been. Landlords will 
typically not rent their units for less if they can get major employers to pay above market-
rates. 
Another consequence of employers leasing homes for employees is disruption to 
neighborhoods. When single-family homes are occupied by a large number of unrelated 
workers, nearby homeowners are concerned about their children's safety and general 
disruption from parking, late hours and noise. 
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Households with Householder Age 65+ 
1990 2000 
# % # % 
-------- ------- -- -- ------~ ~~--~--
Adams _County 312 24.9% 366 25.8% 
-----------
-~~---- ~-----
Council 99 31.0% 101 29.8% 




~\Lalley County 485 20.2% 722 22.5% 
--------------
Cascade 95 26.9% 112 26.6% 
-- - --------
Donnelly 10 19.2% 11 20.0% 
------ ----------
McCall 145 17.6% 185 20.5% 
Source: 2000 Census 
Seniors drive up the demand for employee housing. Seniors are high-rate consumers of 
goods and services, which generates jobs. At the same time, they compete with 
employees for lower-end housing thus limiting the supply of housing available for the 
workforce. 
The senior population will increase in coming years as persons born between 1946 and 
1970 reach retirement age. The first wave of "baby boomers" will be 60 years of age in 
2006. The number of persons reaching retirement age will continue to increase every 
year through 2022 when the "baby boomer bubble" will reach its peak. 
Growth in the senior population will also be fueled by migration to the mountain west. As 
the region evolves into a year-round resort area, seniors may increasingly find it an 
attractive place to live. Steamboat Springs, Colorado recently found that the city's 
retirement age population is increasing at a rate six times the national average. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the biggest jump in proportionate population growth rates in 
several Colorado mountain resort communities was in the 60-plus age category. 
Three age-restricted apartment projects in the region provide 64 rental units for low-
income seniors. All are owned by non-profit organizations and operate near or at full 
occupancy with wait lists. 
Senior Housing Projects 
Project Housing SW #3 








Rent 30% of income 
Wait List 15 
Rees Consulting, Inc. 
Housing SW #4 
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emergency stays in rooms donated by area motels. The agency received 238 crisis line 
calls in 2004 and the first 3.5 months of 2005, most of which (approximately 200) were 
from persons living in Valley County. The agency anticipates an increase in clients as 
more employees move into the area to fill jobs. About half of the persons that Long 
Valley assists are renters and about half are owners. While Long Valley reports that 
displacement of renters by escalating costs has not yet become a significant problem, 
clients are finding it increasingly difficult to find rental housing when they must move 
from their current home. 
Long Valley plans to acquire or develop a facility that can provide emergency shelter and 
transitional housing up to 90 days for three to five families. There are times, like during 
the Winter Carnival, that all motel rooms in Valley County are booked. 
There are no agencies providing services at this time specifically for persons with 
chronic mental illness, developmental disabilities, substance addictions, HIV/AIDS, or 
physical disabilities. 
Rose Advocates 
Rose Advocates has been providing services in Adams County for 10 years like those 
provided by Long Valley in Valley County - emergency shelter, support groups, court 
escorts, and referrals for counseling and legal services for victims of domestic violence. 
The non-profit handles about 100 to 150 calls per year. They now provide motel 
vouchers when emergency shelter is needed but own a cabin donated by the County 
which they hope to convert to a shelter. 
They report that their clients are having a "real problem" finding housing. Women with 
children are having the greatest difficulty. Finding anywhere to rent is a problem and 
having funds for security deposits in addition to rent is beyond the financial means of 
many. They estimate that about 25 clients per year are having difficulty finding housing. 
Rose Advocates reports that they very much need transitional housing where women 
can live with their children for up to one year. They estimate that 10 units of transitional 
housing could be filled almost immediately. 
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issued for new units, which is about the same number as issued during the same period 
in 2004. 
Valley County Residential Building Permits, 2000 - 2004 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: Valley County Building Department 
Nearly half of the residential units under construction are located in unincorporated 
areas of the county. Most of the others are in McCall, where the number of permits 
issued in 2004 was nearly seven times the number issued in 2000. The housing 
proposed in the last three years of subdivision activity is the equivalent of 40% of the 
total housing that existed in McCall in 2000. There has been little new residential 
construction within Cascade and Donnelly compared to the rest of the cou nty but it has 
dramatically increased. In Donnelly, only one permit was issued in the four-year period 
from 2000 through 2003. In 2004, six permits were issued. In Cascade, 3.5 permits 
were issued on average during the first four years of this decade. In 2004, 10 permits 
were issued, an increase of approximately 185%. 
Residential Building Permits, 2000 - May 13, 2005 
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Platted Residential Lots, Valley County 
Vacant Improved Total 
Rural 5,852 5,849 11,701 
Urban 1,692 3,199 4,891 
Total 7,544 9,048 16,592 
Source: County Assessor 
Development potential is greatest in the rural unincorporated areas. Of the over 7,500 
approved but vacant lots in the county, 78% are in unincorporated areas. Only 50% of 
the approved residential lots in the rural areas of Valley County include a home. With 
applications submitted but not yet approved for over 2,000 residential lots in 
unincorporated Valley County will bring the total number of lots available for 
development in just the parts of the county outside cities to over 7,850 lots (5,852 
approved vacant plus approximately 2000 lots in 2005). This means that the number of 
residential units in the rural areas could increase by 134% (from 5,849 improved lots 
now to approximately 13,670) based solely on subdivisions that have been approved or 
submitted for consideration. 
The cities are also growing. At the time of the 2000 census, the City of McCall contained 
approximately 2,250 homes. In 2001, the City processed one 65-lot subdivision and one 
planned unit development (PUD) for a 240-site RV park. Since January 2002, the City 
has approved 17 subdivisions, adding over 290 potential homes to the City. There are 
currently active applications for 22 subdivisions containing 956 proposed homes. 
Development Trends 
Based on recent activity and potential for growth, it appears that development will 
continue at a brisk pace far above historical growth levels into the foreseeable future. All 
of the communities in the region with the exception of Council have recently annexed 
lands into their boundaries, are currently considering requests or have been approached 
by developers with preliminary plans for annexation. Demand for vacation properties 
and resort real estate is booming in most of the mountain west with demand spurred in 
part by mediocre stock market performance. Variables other than land availability and 
market demand will however impact the location and rate growth. 
McCall 
Three annexations have been recently approved by the City including 600 to 700 acres 
for expansion of the Whitetail Resort, a 57-acre parcel planned for development at 
approximately four units per acre and approximately 20 acres that will also be developed 
at four units per acre. None include parcels zoned appropriately for community housing 
other than plans for 13 employee housing dorm rooms and a couple of employee units at 
Whitetail. 
McCall is, to a great degree, the region's center for commercial services, shopping and 
entertainment. It has the largest inventory of housing now occupied by year-round 
residents. Many employees will likely prefer to live in McCall in the future even if they 
are employed elsewhere making the community a receiving community of housing 
demand. Even if the development moratorium temporarily curtails new demand for 
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community known as Morgantown has substandard, dilapidated housing units that could 
be replaced with community housing that is both higher density and better quality. 
Construction of a mobile home park might also be viable in New Meadows, providing 
homeownership opportunities that are more affordably priced than in Valley County. 
Council 
Of the communities in the region, Council has been impacted the least thus far by the 
current development boom. There is, however, economic growth in the community and 
opportunities for additional development. Improvements are being made to the 
downtown area and the industrial park has room for new businesses. The possible 
construction of a highway that would lead from Emmett to Indian Valley then onto 
Donnelly could significantly change Council in the future. Though there has been little 
new construction as of late, interviewees report that land speculation is now widespread. 
While most of the growth now occurring stems east and north from Tamarack, Council 
could become a resort community serving as a bed base and retail/commercial center 
for Tamarack. 
Rural Valley County 
The Tamarack Resort is undeniably the most significant engine driving development in 
the region. The Resort is now in its second year of a planned 10- to 15-year sellout. 
Tamarack plans to become a year-round destination resort with Alpine and Nordic 
skiing, 18 holes of golf, 300,000 square feet of commercial space and 2,043 residential 
units. Sales of lots have been brisk. The rate at which development and employment 
generation will occur is difficult to project at this time, however, since 2004/05 was its 
first ski season. The Resort will open with six holes of golf this summer. Thus far, 
40,000 square feet of commercial space has been placed in service. The Members 
Lodge, an 86,000 square-foot lodge, is scheduled for completion by December 2005. 
Plans for a 16,500 square-foot conference center are in the works. Tamarack's 
employment growth will parallel development with an increase of up to 10% in the next 
year. This would equate to approximately 30 additional employees during the peak 
winter season. 
Tamarack is by no means the only development in rural Valley County that will generate 
jobs and fuel the demand for community housing. Other major developments include 
Jug Mountain, Meadows at West Mountain, Gold Fork Bay Village, Fir Grove, Arrowhead 
and commercial buildings in Lake Fork. 
Rural Adams County 
A volunteer committee is now looking at land use and rezoning of the county to 
implement the 2000 Comprehensive Plan. This effort could limit development of 
agricultural, timber and grazing lands and allow for greater densities in the municipal 
impact zones around Council and New Meadows. This would have a positive impact on 
community housing by making it possible to develop land near towns at prices that might 
be affordable for employees while limiting the high-end construction on acreage, which 
stimulates demand for employee housing. 
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Overall, 2.9 employees work in every 1,000 square feet of commercial space. The ratios 
are considerably higher than the overall average for restaurants and bars (8.0 per 1,000 
SF), recreation-related establishments (5.8 per 1,000 SF) and real estate/property 
management offices (6.0 per 1,000 SF). Research has shown that these job generation 
ratios change very little over time. 
The rates for lodging and professionally managed vacation properties are unique in that 
they are expressed on a per room or unit basis rather than per 1,000 square feet. The 
rate for lodging is .7 employees per room. 
In the two-county region, permits were issued for 77,244 new square feet of commercial 
space. This total does not reflect all commercial construction that is occurring in the 
region. It only includes one floor of the lodge now being built at Tamarack and only 
5,000 square feet in 2005 in Donnelly where 36,000 square feet of commercial space is 
planned for construction this summer. 
Based solely on permits issued as of the end of May, demand was generated for 217 
employee housing units. Additional demand for approximately 200 units will be 
generated by roughly 125,000 square feet of commercial space that is planned for 
construction by the end of the year. 
Jobs and Housing Demand Generated by New Commercial Space 
New Sq. Jobs/! ,000 Jobs Employees! Housing 
Ft SF Generated Housing Demand 
Unit Generated 
Adams County 2,160 2.9 6.26 1.8 3.5 
Council 1,800 2.9 5.22 1.8 2.9 
New Meadows 360 2.9 1.04 1.8 0.6 
Unincorporated 0 2.9 0.00 1.8 0.0 
Valley County 132,775 2.9 385.05 1.8 213.9 
Cascade 1,667 2.9 4.83 1.8 2.7 
Donnelly 26,868 2.9 77.92 1.8 43.3 
McCall 26,896 2.9 78.00 1.8 43.3 
Un incorporated 77,344 2.9 224.30 1.8 124.6 
Total 134,935 2.9 391.31 1.8 217.4 
Residential 
Residential growth has added to both the supply of and demand for housing. 
Residential dwelling units generate demand for housing through their operation and 
maintenance. Activities including exterior and interior maintenance and upkeep, house 
cleaning, meal preparation, child care, personal services and home office support 
generate jobs, many of which are relatively low paying. The employees that fill these 
jobs generate demand for modestly-priced housing. 
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demanded minus 250 units supplied). This estimate should be considered conservative. 
It is likely that the relationship between second homes/vacation accommodations and 
primary residences is shifting, and that employees are occupying fewer than 210 of the 
725 new residential units. 
It should also be noted that the estimate of net demand for 210 additional employee 
housing units considers only the demand generated by permanent employment in 
commercial space and residential units, and does not include the impact on demand 
from construction workers. It also does not take into demand that is arising from 
retirees, disabled person, others who are not employed and those who work at home. 
Demand by Income 
Given housing prices, it is likely that most of the units built since 2003 that accommodate 
employees were purchased by those with middle and upper incomes. Only 34% of 
homes sold in 2004 were affordable for households with incomes at or below 100% of 
the median. If it is assumed that 34% of the estimated 250 housing units occupied by 
employees since 2003 serve low- and moderate-income households with income equal 
to or less than 100% AMI, there is then net demand for 145 units priced to be affordable 
for households with incomes equal to or less than the median. The remaining 65 units 
that are needed to meet the existing deficient should be priced to target households with 
incomes at or above 100% AMI. 
Net Demand Estimates by Income 
Total 
Gross Demand for Employee Units 460 
% Income ::;;100% AMI 
# Units Demanded by AMI 
Increase in Local Resident Housing Supply 250 
% Affordable by AMI 
# New Units Affordable 
Net Demand for Additional Units 
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DonnellylTamarack 
The North Lake Recreation Sewer and Water District, which was originally developed to 
serve the Tamarack development and which is now acquiring the City of Donnelly 
system, was sized to serve 1,550 units at Tamarack and 46 to 69 units not associated 
with Tamarack. The estimates of growth between Donnelly and Tamarack were very 
underestimated. The District estimates that between $10 and $12 million is needed for 
expansion of the treatment plant or the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality may 
impose a moratorium on will service permits. 
Cascade 
With the recent bond approval, the City of Cascade should have ample water and 
sewage treatment capacity for the near future. 
Council 
Storm drainage is now exhausting the capacity of the City's sewage treatment system. 
Improvements to Council's downtown area should reduce this problem and allow for 
development to occur on the south side of the community. Expansion of the system will 
likely be required, however, to accommodate additional growth at some point in the 
future depending upon the rate of development. 
New Meadows 
The sewer treatment system has capacity for approximately 250 additional taps. The 
City is currently considering subdivision applications and annexation requests that could 
exceed this capacity. 
Financing 
Financing for community housing is limited. There are no local sources of revenue, like 
an impact fee, real estate transfer tax or sales tax, that generate funds earmarked 
specifically for community housing. Budget appropriations for Federal housing programs 
are being cut. USDA's Office of Rural Development, the agency that has provided 
financing for several low-income rental projects in the area, will be less likely to fund 
projects in the future as incomes increase. Other sources of project financing, like Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (L1HTC or Section 42), can be utilized for some projects but 
are not usually used for seasonal employee housing and are not ideal for small-scale 
projects. 
Regulatory Barriers 
Development fees for application review, building permits, and water/sewer taps are 
relatively low compared to many resort communities and other areas with high housing 
costs and, as such, should not be a Significant impediment to the development of 
housing for low and moderate income households. Fees may increase however as 
infrastructure improvements are required. If fees escalate, providing means for waiving 
or deferring fees for units that serve lower-income households may be needed. 
Rees Consulting, Inc. Page 74 
Addendum 1 - Housing Needs Assessment 
June 2005 
Seasonality 
Seasonality in employment and housing occupancy levels should not be a significant 
barrier to community housing development. As described in THE ECONOMY section of 
this report, employment levels have varied by season with approximately 1,275 more 
employees during the peak summer months in the region than during the winter. This 
pattern is changing, however with the opening of the Tamarack Resort and the 
continuation of construction activity throughout the winter. This change is positive in 
terms of the feasibility of developing community housing. It is difficult to finance and 
achieve sustaining occupancies on units where seasonal fluctuations are as significant 
as they have been in the region. 
Language 
The number of employees of Hispanic/Latino origin working in the region is increasing. 
Although up-to-date data are not available, this is a predictable trend given the 
experience of other region in the mountain west. Housing providers are not prepared to 
deal with language barriers. Few property managers and leasing agents speak Spanish, 
and most documents including applications and leases are only in English. Language 
could become a significant obstacle in the future. 
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demand for employee housing while they will compete with employees for both rental 
and ownership opportunities. 
Approximately 40% of all households in the two counties have low incomes. This 
equates to a 2005 estimate of at least 2,080 households with incomes equal to or less 
than 80% AMI. Just over half of these households have very low or extremely low 
incomes. 
Incomes are higher in Valley County than in Adams County but the difference between 
the two is decreasing. A household earning 100% of the median income can afford to 
purchase homes priced up to $150,000. The maximum affordable price for low-income 
households at 80% AMI is in the $100,000 to $120,000 range. 
The Economy 
Employment is increasing with an increase of 217 jobs in Valley County and 50 jobs in 
Adams County since 2003. Again, the estimates appear very low for Valley County but 
still are reflective of the change that is occurring. Seasonality is decreasing. The 
reduction in seasonality will increase the feasibility of community housing projects by 
improving occupancy levels. 
Employers are being negatively impacted by the lack of affordable housing for their 
employees. Most of the employers interviewed reported that they have been unable to 
fill jobs and attribute that difficulty directly to housing. Though the sample was not large 
or statistically valid, about 4% of the jobs offered by employers interviewed were unfilled. 
While there has historically been a labor shortage during the summer months, it now 
extends throughout the year. 
Most of the employers interviewed report that they plan to increase the number of jobs 
they offer within the next couple of years. Other businesses are moving into the area 
and will need employees to operate. The lack of housing will be an impediment to 
employment growth, however, unless development of affordable units catches up and 
keeps up with job-generating growth. 
Commuting has not been widespread in the region - employers report that most of their 
employees reside nearby, and the Census found that the vast majority of residents work 
in the county in which they reside. If additional housing is not provided where jobs are 
being created, however, commuting will increase. The negative consequences of this 
increase include retail leakage, traffic congestion, employment problems like tardiness 
and absenteeism, inflationary impacts on housing prices, and losses to the communities 
and their families resulting from members spending long hours getting between work 
and home. 
Though published estimates do not represent it, the greatest increase in employment 
has been in the construction industry with roughly 700 to 1,000 construction workers 
during the peak summer season. Approximately 80% to 90% of these workers are 
brought in from outside of the region. Construction workers are competing with lower-
wage employees for housing forcing up rental prices and decreasing availability. 
Growth and construction will not end when Tamarack is fully built out. The level of 
activity will vary with highs and lows fluctuating with the national economy but it will not 
stop. The permanent construction work force will be larger than historical levels. In 
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Rents have increased roughly 35% to 50% since 2000. The greatest increases have 
been in Valley County, particularly in the McCall and Donnelly areas. Mobile homes are 
the least expensive units to rent. Apartments are next followed closely by 
condominiums. Single-family homes typically rent for more than double the cost of 
mobile homes. Rates are now generally affordable for households with incomes at or 
below 80% AMI but above the level that households at 50% AMI can afford to pay. 
While the number of rental units has recently increased due to a small amount of new 
construction and conversion of vacation cabins and condos into rentals, vacancies are 
negligible. The number of existing rentals will decline as demand for vacation 
accommodations rise, owners cash out taking advantage of market appreciation and 
mobile home parks are lost to redevelopment. 
Home prices are generally far above the affordable level for most households in the two-
county region and are increasing. Households earning 100% of the median income in 
the region can afford to purchase homes costing around $150,000. Cascade and 
Council were the only communities in the region where the median price of homes sold 
in 2004 (single-family homes, condominiums and mobile homes on land) was less than 
$150,000. In McCall and New Meadows, the median price in 2004 was close to 
$200,000. 
Homes currently listed for sale are priced higher than the homes sold in 2004. In all 
areas except New Meadows, the median price of homes listed for sale is more than 
twice the median price of homes sold last year. In New Meadows, the increase is still 
significant at close to 50%. While approximately 34% of homes sold in the region in 
2004 cost less than $150,000, only 11 % of the homes listed for sale in early 2005 (22 
units) are in this price range. Donnelly has been the hardest hit with a 315% increase 
between the median value in 2000 and the 2005 median price of homes listed for sale. 
The inventory of homes available for purchase is small. With an inventory of less than 
six months, it is a sellers market where purchase prices are close to, equal or even 
exceed list prices. With little inventory for sale and negligible rental vacancies, housing 
demand must be addressed by development of new units. 
Community Housing 
At least 1,467 households in the two-county region (approximately 28% of all 
households) spend more than 30% of their gross income on their housing payment, 
which is the amount they can afford. Overcrowding has not been a significant problem 
except in Donnelly but it is likely increasing as employees move into the area, rents rise 
and availability decreases. 
The five largest apartment complexes in the two counties combined have a total of only 
70 units but represent the bulk of the apartment inventory in the region. Four of the 
projects (53 units) are publicly subsidized with restrictions that make them affordable for 
low-income households. These properties are all small (less than 20 units each), aging 
and have few amenities. All are operating near or at full occupancy with only temporary 
vacancies resulting from turnover and applications on file. 
None of the homes owned by their occupants are permanently affordable. All are free-
market units that will likely appreciate in value beyond what is affordable for moderate-
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According to the 2000 Census, 20% of the persons living in Adams County and 16% of 
Valley County's population have a disability, which is a long-lasting physical, mental, or 
emotional condition. Although the subsidized apartment projects in the region have 
handicapped accessible units and residents who are disabled, housing specifically 
designed for persons with other types of disabilities, such as chronic mental illness, is 
not provided in the region. Provision for incorporating units for persons with special 
needs in all community housing projects should be considered. 
Non-profit and public social service providers report increases in the demand for their 
services and changes in their clientele. They report that finding housing is one of the 
greatest difficulties faced by the populations they serve. Transitional and emergency 
shelter housing is needed for victims of domestic violence and temporary rent subsidies 
are needed for others who are displaced. 
Development Trends and Forecasts 
Valley County is in the midst of a development boom. As of May this year, rural 
subdivision applications had been approved or were being processed for 1,778 lots, 
which is eight times the number approved in 2004 and more than 20 times the average 
number approved between 1992 and 2003. In addition, 12 subdivision applications had 
just been submitted with over 300 lots. In 2004, permits were issued for 531 new 
residential units in Valley County's rural areas and cities, which is more than three times 
the number issued in 2000. 
There is no end in sight. Ample land is available for development to continue into the 
foreseeable future. In Valley County, over 7,500 lots are platted but vacant not including 
the subdivision applications that are pending for approximately 1,700 lots in 
unincorporated parts of the county. The pending subdivisions in the cities are also not in 
this figure. The total number of lots available for development in Valley County could 
easily exceed 10,000 before the end of the year. 
The rate and location of future development will be determined by multiple variables 
including the stock market, demand for resort real estate, the availability of water and 
sewage treatment, the potential construction of a highway between Emmett and the 
Indian Valley then over to Donnelly, and possible efforts to manage growth. 
Barriers to Community Housing 
Barriers to the development of community housing include: 
• Zoning which does not allow densities greater than four units per acre on most 
land served by central water and sewer systems; 
• Public perceptions that government should not be involved in housing and that 
community housing will have negative impacts on property values and 
neighborhoods; 
• Limited sewage treatment capacity; and, 
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continues. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit program (also referred to as 
Section 42 financing) is one of the most frequently used ways by which private 
developers are able to construct apartments where at least a portion of the units 
are for low-income households below free-market rents. The projects should be 
located near places of employment. While this program is not appropriate for 
construction workers and has not been used with success for seasonal 
employees, there are many year-round renters living in the region who could 
income qualify. 
• Work with Tamarack and construction contractors to provide housing that is 
designed specifically for seasonal employees including resort and construction 
workers. 
• Encourage non-profit housing organizations to develop housing and expand 
housing programs in the area. Non-profit groups like Habitat for Humanity, 
Neighborhood Housing Services and Mercy Housing can supplement the efforts 
of a local housing authority and private developers. They have experience and 
access to funding, and they typically target population groups that others have 
difficulty serving. The Southwestern Idaho Cooperative Housing Authority should 
be encouraged through the provision of technical assistance and financing to 
expand services in the area such as the Section 8 rent subsidy voucher program 
and senior housing. 
• Provide City and County general funds for housing or establish a local source of 
revenue specifically for community housing. Federal funds can only be used for 
low-income households yet moderate- and middle-income residents are being 
priced out of homeownership opportunities and may find rents beyond their reach 
in the future. Even if inclusionary zoning and linkage requirements are adopted, 
private development will not serve all populations and needs. 
• Provide publicly-owned land for community housing projects either by sale or 
lease to developers. 
• Improve local record keeping systems to monitor development activity, calculate 
the housing demand generated by this development, assess changes in the 
housing supply, identify trends and evaluate progress toward meeting agreed 
upon housing-related goals. 
• Modify Comprehensive Plans to provide vision, explicit goals and quantitative 
objectives for community housing. Amend zoning and development codes to 
include incentives for employee and other affordable housing development. 
Consideration should be given to allowing density bonuses, set back reductions, 
reductions in minimum lot size and open space requirements. Implement priority 
review systems that move development applications containing community 
housing to the front of the review and action queue. When taps or permits are 
limited, give priority to projects with community housing projects as being done in 
McCall. 
• Address public perceptions about community housing in a proactive manner. 
Identify and mobilize residents who have unmet housing needs to serve as 
advocates for community housing. Educate the public about the need for and 
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Addendum 2 - Timeline 
Date Author or Actor Document or Event 
2123/2006 City Council Ordinance No. 819 and 820 adopted 
6120/2006 Alpine Village Applications for Preliminary Plat; PUD Preliminary Plan, CUP, 
Scenic Route and Amendment of Zoning Map filed ("Preliminary 
Applications") 
6/4/2006 Alpine Village Community Housing Plan submitted with Applications 
7126/2006 Planning & Staff Report 
Zoning 
9122/2006 Mountain Central Lawsuit filed challenging Ordinance Nos. 819, 820 
Board of Realtors 
10/3/2006 P&Z recommends approval of Alpine Village Applications 
IZoning 
12113/2006 City Council City Council approves Preliminary Applications for Alpine Village 
1/512007 Alpine Village Purchase and Sale Agreement entered into to acquire "The Timbers" 
3112/2007 Alpine Village Revised Community Housing Plan submitted 
3/22/2007 City Council City Council approved Preliminary and Final Plat Applications for 
the conversion of the Timbers 
4/16/2007 Alpine Village Alpine Village closed on the purchase of the Timbers project 
8/23/2007 City Council City Council approved Final Plat for Phase 1 of Alpine Village 
12/13/2007 Alpine Village I Alpine Village Development Agreement signed 
City Council 
1128/2008 Alpine Village Alpine Village Development Agreement recorded 
2/11/2008 Alpine Village Alpine Village Development Agreement re-recorded to attach 
exhibits 
2119/2008 District Court Memorandum Decision and Order entered in Mountain Central 
Board of Realtors v. City of McCall 
4/7/2008 Alpine Village Alpine Village Development Agreement re-recorded to correct error 
in legal description 
4/24/2008 City Council Ordinance No. 856 adopted repeal ing Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820; 
Adopted Resolution 08-11 
6/26/2008 City Council Ordinance No. 08-17 adopted 
8/20/2008 Alpine Village I First Amendment to Alpine Village Development Agreement signed 
City Council by Alpine Village 
11/4/2009 City Council Resolution 09-10 adopted repealing Ordinance No. 08-17 
